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Abstract
In everyday life it happens that a person has to reason about what other people think
and how they behave, in order to achieve his goals. In other words, an individual may
be required to adapt his behaviour by reasoning about the others’ mental state. In this
paper we focus on a knowledge representation language derived from logic programming
which both supports the representation of mental states of individual communities and
provides each with the capability of reasoning about others’ mental states and acting
accordingly. The proposed semantics is shown to be translatable into stable model se-
mantics of logic programs with aggregates. To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic
Programming (TPLP).
KEYWORDS: logic programming, stable model semantics, knowledge representation
1 Introduction
In everyday life it happens that a person has to reason about what other people
think and how they behave, in order to achieve his goals. In other words, an in-
dividual may be required to adapt his behaviour by reasoning about the others’
mental state. This typically happens in the context of cooperation and negotiation:
for instance, an individual can propose his own goals if he knows that they would
be acceptable to the others. Otherwise he can decide not to make them public.
As a consequence, one can increase the success chances of his actions, by having
information about the other individuals’ knowledge.
In this paper we focus on a knowledge representation language derived from logic
programming which both supports the representation of mental states of individ-
ual communities and provides each with the capability of reasoning about others’
mental states and acting accordingly. The proposed semantics is shown to be trans-
latable into stable model semantics of logic programs with aggregates.
We give the flavor of the proposal by two introductory examples, wherein we de-
scribe the features of our approach in an informal, yet deep fashion. Even though in
these examples, as well as elsewhere in the paper, we use the term agent to denote
∗ An abridged version of this paper appears in (Buccafurri and Caminiti 2005).
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the individual reasoning, we remark that our focus is basically concerning to the
knowledge-representation aspects, with no intention to investigate how this reason-
ing layer could be exploited in the intelligent-agent contexts. However, in Section 8,
we relate our work with some conceptual aspects belonging to this research field.
Consider now the first example.
Example 1
There are four agents which have been invited to the same wedding party. These
are the desires of the agents:
Agent1 will go to the party only if at least the half of the total number of agents
(not including himself) goes there.
Agent2 possibly does not go to the party, but he tolerates such an option. In case
he goes, then he possibly drives the car.
Agent3 would like to join the party together with Agent2, but he does not trust
on Agent2’s driving skill. As a consequence, he decides to go to the party only
if Agent2 both goes there and does not want to drive the car.
Agent4 does not go to the party.
Now, assume that some agents are less autonomous than the others, i.e. they may
decide either to join the party or not to go at all, possibly depending on the other
agents’ choice. Moreover some agents may not require, yet tolerate some options.
The standard approach to representing communities by means of logic-based
agents (Satoh and Yamamoto 2002; Costantini and Tocchio 2002; De Vos et al. 2005;
Alberti et al. 2004; Subrahmanian et al. 2000) is founded on suitable extensions of
logic programming with negation as failure (not) where each agent is represented
by a single program whose intended models (under a suitable semantics) are the
agent’s desires/requests. Although we take this as a starting point, it is still not
suitable to model the above example because of two following issues:
1. There is no natural representation for tolerated options, i.e. options which are
not requested, but possibly accepted (see Agent2).
2. A machinery is missing which enables one agent to reason about the behaviour
of other agents (see Agent1 and Agent3).
In order to solve the first issue (item 1.) we use an extension of standard logic pro-
gramming exploiting the special predicate okay(), previously introduced in (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002).
Therein a model-theoretic semantics aimed to represent a common agreement in
a community of agents was given. However, representing the requests/acceptances
of single agents in a community is not enough. Concerning item 2 above, a social
language should also provide a machinery to model possible interference among
agents’ reasoning (in fact it is just such an interference that distinguishes the so-
cial reasoning from the individual one). To this aim, we introduce a new construct
providing one agent with the ability to reason about other agents’ mental state and
then to act accordingly.
Program rules have the form:
head← [selection condition]{body},
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Table 1. The wedding party (Example 1)
P1(Agent1) : go wedding ← [
n
2
− 1, ]{go wedding}
P2(Agent2) : okay(go wedding)←
okay(drive)← go wedding
P3(Agent3) : go wedding ← [Agent2]{go wedding , not drive}
P4(Agent4) : empty program
where selection condition predicates about some social condition concerning either
the cardinality of communities or particular individuals satisfying body.
For instance, consider the following rule, belonging to a program representing a
given agent A:
a ← [ l, h ] {b, not c}
This rule means that agent A will require a in case a number ν of agents (other
than A) exists such that they require or tolerate b, neither require nor tolerate c
and it holds that 0 ≤ l ≤ ν ≤ h ≤ n − 1. By default, l = 0 and h = n − 1. The
number n is a parameter – known by each agent – representing the total number
of agents (including the agent A). This enriched language is referred to as SOcial
Logic Programming (SOLP). The wedding party scenario of Example 1 can be
represented by the four SOLP programs shown in Table 1, where the program P4
is empty since the corresponding agent has not any request or desire to express.
The intended models represent the mental states of each agent inside the com-
munity. Concerning the party, such models are the following:
M1 = ∅, M2 = {go weddingP1 , go weddingP2 , driveP2}, and M3 = {go weddingP1 ,
go weddingP2 , go weddingP3}, where the subscript Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) references, for
each atom in a model, the program (resp. agent) that atom is entailed by. The
models respectively mean that either (M1) no agent will go to the party, (M2) only
Agent1 and Agent2 will go and also Agent2 will drive the car, or (M3) all agents
but Agent4 will go to the party.
Let us show why the above models represent the intended meaning of the pro-
gram:M1 is empty in caseAgent2 does not go to the wedding party (i.e. go wedding
is not derived by P2). Indeed, in such a case, Agent3 will not go too, since his re-
quirements w.r.t. Agent2 are not satisfied. Moreover, since Agent4 expresses nei-
ther requirements nor tolerated options, he does not go to the party (observe that
such a behaviour is also represented by the models M2 and M3). Finally, Agent1
requires that at least one1 agent (other than himself) goes to the party. As a conse-
quence of the other agents’ behaviour, Agent1 will not go. Thus, no agent will go
to the party and M1 is empty. The intended meaning of M2 is that both Agent1
1 Since n
2
− 1 = 1, where n is the total number of agents, i.e. n=4.
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and Agent2 will go to the party and Agent2 will also drive the car. In such a
case Agent3 will not go since he requires that Agent2 does not drive the car. The
model M3 represents the case in which Agent2 goes to the party, but does not
drive the car. Now, since all requirements of Agent3 are satisfied, then he also will
go to the party. Certainly, Agent1 will join the other agents, because, in order to
go to the party, he requires that at least one agent goes there.
The intended models are referred to as social models, since they express the
results of the interactions among agents. As it will be analyzed in Section 6, the
multiplicity of intended models is induced both by negation occurring in rule bodies
and also directly by the social features, thus making the approach non-trivial.
Let us informally introduce the most important properties of the semantics of
the language:
• Social conditions model reasoning conditioned by the behaviour of other
agents in the community. In particular, it is possible to represent collective
mental states, preserving the possibility of identifying the behaviour of each
agent.
• It is possible to nest social conditions, in order to apply recursively the social-
conditioned reasoning to agents’ subsets of the community.
• Each social model represents the mental state (i.e. desires, requirements, etc.)
of every agent in case the social conditions imposed by the agents are enabled.
Observe that, in order to meet such goals, merging all the input SOLP programs it
is not enough, since this way we lose all information about the relationship between
an atom and the program (resp. agent) which such an atom comes from. Therefore,
we have to find a non-trivial solution.
Our approach starts from (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002), where the Joint Fix-
point Semantics (JFP), that is a semantics providing a way to reach a compromise
(in terms of a common agreement) among agents modelled by logic programs, is
proposed. Therein, each model contains atoms representing items being common to
all the agents. The approach proposed here in order to reach a social-based conclu-
sion is more general: the agents’ behaviour is defined by taking into account social
conditions specified by the agents themselves.
Informally, a social condition is an expression [selection condition]{body}, where
selection condition can be of two forms: either (i) cardinality-based, or (ii) identity-
based. In the former case the agent requires that a number of other agents (bounded
by selection condition itself) satisfy body. In the latter case, selection condition
identifies which agent is required to satisfy body. Given a program rule including a
social condition such as head← [selection condition]{body}, the intuitive meaning
is that head is derived if the social condition is satisfied.
An example of cardinality-based condition (case (i) above) is shown in Table 1
by the program P1: an intended model M will include the atom go weddingP1 if a
set of programs S ′ ⊆ {P2,P3,P4} exists such that for each P ∈ S ′, it results that
go weddingP belongs to M and also it holds that the number of programs in S
′
satisfies the social condition imposed by the program P1, that is |S ′| ≥
n
2 − 1.
An example of case (ii) (identity-based condition) is represented by the program
A Knowledge-Representation Language with Social Features 5
P3, which requests the atom go weddingP3 to be part of an intended model M if
go weddingP2 belongs to M , but the atom driveP2 does not. Importantly, social
conditions can be nested each other, as shown by the next example.
Example 2
Consider a Peer-to-Peer file-sharing system where a user can share his collection
of files with other users on the Internet. In order to get better performance, a
file is split in several parts being downloaded separately (possibly each part from
a different user)2. The following SOLP program P describes the behaviour of an
agent (acting on behalf of a given user) that wants to download every file X being
shared by at least a number min of users such that at least one of them owns a
complete version of X (rule r1). Moreover, the agent tolerates to share any file X
of his, which is shared also by at least the 33% of the total number of users in the
network and such that among those users, a number of them (bounded between
20% and 70% of the total) exists having a high bandwidth. In this case the agent
tolerates to share, since he is sure that the network traffic will not be unbalanced
(rule r2). Observe that the use of nested social conditions in P is emphasized by
means of program indentation.
r1 : download(X )← [min, ]{share(X ),
[1, ]{not incomplete(X )
},file(X )
r2 : okay(share(X )) ← [0.33 ∗ n, ]{share(X ),
[0.2 ∗ n, 0.7 ∗ n]{high bw}
},file(X )
Now, one could argue that a different choice concerning the selection condition
could be done. As a first observation we note that the chosen selection conditions
play frequently an important role in common-sense reasoning. Indeed, it often hap-
pens that the beliefs and the choices of an individual depend on how many people
think or act in a certain way. For instance, a person who needs a new mobile phone
is interested in collecting – from his colleagues or the Internet – a number of opin-
ions on a given model, in order to decide whether he should buy it. It occurs also
that one is interested in the behaviour of a given person, in order to act or to
infer something. For example, two people are doing shopping together and do not
want to buy the same clothes in order not to be dressed the same way. So, one of
them decides not to buy a given item, in case it has been chosen by his partner.
These short examples show that two important parameters acting in the social in-
fluence are either (i) the number or (ii) the identity of the people involved. For such
a reason, we propose a simple, clear-cut, yet general mechanism to represent the
selection of a social condition.
As a second observation we remark that this work represents a first step to-
wards a thorough study on how to include in a classical logic-programming setting
the paradigm of social interference, in order to directly represent community-based
2 Among others, KaZaA, EMule and BitTorrent are the most popular Internet P2P file-sharing
systems exploiting such a feature.
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reasoning. To this aim, we focus on some suitable selection conditions, but we are
aware that other possible choices might be considered. From this perspective, our
work tries to give some non-trivial contributions towards what kind of features a
knowledge representation language should include, in order to be oriented to com-
plex scenarios. Anyway, as it will be shown by examples throughout the paper, the
chosen social conditions combined with the power of nesting allow us to represent
more articulated selections among agents.
Besides the definition of the language, of its semantics and the application to
Knowledge Representation, another contribution of the paper is the translation
of SOLP programs into logic programs with aggregates3. In particular, given a
set of SOLP programs, a source-to-source transformation exists which provides as
output a single logic program with aggregates whose stable models are in one-
to-one correspondence with the social models of the set of SOLP programs. The
translation to logic programs with aggregates give us the possibility of exploiting
existing engines to compute logic programs.
Moreover, Section 6 shows that our kind of social reasoning is not trivial, since
even in the case of positive programs, the semantics of SOLP has a computational
complexity which is NP-complete.
The paper is organized as follows: in Sections 2 and 3 we define the notion of
SOLP programs and their semantics (Social Semantics), respectively. In Section 4
we illustrate how a set of SOLP programs, each representing a different agent, is
translated into a single logic program with aggregates whose stable models describe
the mental states of the whole agent community and then we show that such a
translation is sound and complete. In Section 5 we prove that the Social Semantics
extends the JFP Semantics (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002) and in Section 6 we
study the complexity of several interesting decision problems. Section 7 describes
how this novel approach may be used for knowledge representation by means of
several examples. Then, in Section 8 we discuss related proposals and, finally, we
draw our conclusions ans sketch the future directions of the work.
In order to improve the overall readability, these sections are followed by Appendix A
– where we have placed the proofs of the most complicated technical results – and
by the list of symbols and abbreviations used throughout the paper.
2 Syntax of SOLP Programs
In this section we first introduce the notion of social condition and then we describe
the syntax of SOLP programs.
A term is either a variable or a constant. Variables are denoted by strings starting
with uppercase letters, while those starting with lower case letters denote constants.
An atom or positive literal is an expression p(t1, · · · , tn), where p is a predicate of
arity n and t1, · · · , tn are terms. A negative literal is the negation as failure (NAF)
not a of a given atom a.
3 As it will be shown in Section 4, we choose the syntax of the non-disjunctive fragment of
DLPA (Dell’Armi et al. 2003), supported by the DLV system (Leone et al. 2002).
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Definition 1
Given an integer n > 0, a (n-)social condition s , also referred to as (n-)SC, is an
expression of the form cond(s) property(s), such that:
(1) cond(s) is an expression [α] where α is either (i) a pair of integers l , h such
that 0 ≤ l ≤ h ≤ n − 1, or (ii) a string;
(2) property(s) = content(s) ∪ skel(s), where content(s) is a non-empty set of
literals and skel(s) is a (possibly empty) set of SCs.
n-social conditions operate over a collection of n programs representing the agent
community. Each agent is modelled by a program (we will formally define later in
this section which kind of programs are allowed). n represents the total number of
agents. In the following, whenever the context is clear, n is omitted.
Concerning item (1) of the above definition, in case (i), cond(s) is referred to as
cardinal selection condition, while, in case (ii), cond(s) is referred to as member
selection condition.
Concerning item (2) of Definition 1, if skel(s) = ∅ then s is said simple. For a
simple SC s such that content(s) is singleton, the enclosing braces can be omitted.
Finally, given a SC s , the formula not s is referred to as the NAF of s . The following
are simple SCs extracted from our initial wedding party example (see Table 1):
Example 3
[n2 − 1, ]{go wedding}.
Example 4
[Agent2]{go wedding, not drive}.
The social conditions occurring in the example regarding a Peer-to-Peer sys-
tem (see Example 2) are not simple. As a further example, consider a SC s =
[l , h]{a, b, c, [l1, h1]{d , [l2, h2]e}, [l3, h3]f }. Observe that s is not simple, since skel(s) =
{[l1, h1]{d , [l2, h2]e}, [l3, h3]f }, moreover, content(s) = {a, b, c}.
Social conditions enable agents to specify requirements over either individual or
groups within the agent community, by using member or cardinal selection condi-
tions, respectively. Moreover, by nesting social conditions it is possible to declare
requirements over sub-groups of agents, provided that a super-group satisfying a SC
exists. In order to guarantee the correct specifications of nested social conditions,
the notion of well-formed social condition is introduced next.
Given two n-SCs s and s ′ such that cond(s) = [l , h] and cond(s ′) = [l ′, h′]
(0 ≤ l ≤ h ≤ n−1, 0 ≤ l ′ ≤ h′ ≤ n−1), if h′ ≤ h, then we write cond(s ′) ⊆ cond(s).
A SC s is well-formed if either (i) s is simple, or (ii) s is not simple, cond(s) is a
cardinal selection condition and ∀s ′ ∈ skel(s) it holds that either (a) cond(s ′) is a
cardinal selection condition, s ′ is a well-formed social condition and cond(s ′) ⊆ cond(s),
or (b) cond(s ′) is a member selection condition and s ′ is simple.
According to the intuitive explanation of the above definition, it results that,
besides simple SCs, only non-simple SCs with cardinal selection condition are can-
didate to be well formed. Indeed, a non-simple SC with member selection condition
requires some property on a single target agent, but no further sub-group of agents
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could be specified by means of SCs possibly nested in it. Anyway, a further prop-
erty is required to SCs with cardinal selection condition in order to be well-formed.
In particular, given a non-simple SC s (with cardinal selection condition), all the
SCs nested in s with cardinal condition must not exceed the cardinality constraints
expressed by cond(s).
Example 5
The SC s = [1, 8]{a, [3, 6]{b, [Agent
2
]{c, d}}} is well-formed. Note that the non-
simple SCs s1 = [Agent3]{a, [3, 6]{b}} and s2 = [4, 7]{a, [3, 9]b} are not well-
formed, because cond(s1) is a member selection condition and, concerning s2, [3, 9]b ∈
skel(s2) and [3, 9] 6⊆ [4, 7].
From now on, we consider only well-formed SCs.
We introduce now the notion of rule. Our definition generalizes the notion of
classical logic rule.
Definition 2
Given an integer n > 0, a (n-)social rule r is a formula a ← b1∧ · · · ∧bm∧s1∧ · · · ∧sk
(m ≥ 0, k ≥ 0), where a is an atom, each bi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) is a literal and each sj
(1 ≤ j ≤ k) is either a n-SC or the NAF of a n-SC.
Concerning the above definition, the atom a is referred to as the head of r , while
the conjunction b1 ∧ · · · ∧ bm ∧ s1 ∧ · · · ∧ sk is referred to as the body of r .
In case a is of the form okay(p), where p is an atom, then r it is referred to as
(n-)tolerance (social) rule. In case k = 0, then a social non-tolerance rule is referred
to as classical rule.
Social tolerance rules, i.e. rules with head of the form okay(p), encode tolerance
about the occurrence of p. The rule okay(p)← body differs from the rule p ← body
since the latter produces the derivation of p whenever body is satisfied, thus encoding
something that is required under the condition expressed by body. According to the
former rule (okay(p) ← body), the truth of body does not necessarily imply p, yet
its derivation is not in contrast with the intended meaning of the rule itself. In this
sense, under the condition expressed by body, p is just tolerated.
Given a rule r , we denote by head(r) (resp. body(r)) the head (resp. the body) of
r . Moreover, r is referred to as a fact in case the body is empty, while r is referred
to as an integrity constraint if the head is missing.
Example 6
An example of non-tolerance social rule is a ← b, c, [1, 9]{b, c,not g, [1, 4]{d}}, [P2]{d}.
An example of tolerance social rule is okay(a)←not b, c, [1, 6]{a,not f , g},not [P2]{d}.
Definition 3
A SOLP collection is a set {P1, · · · ,Pn} of SOLP programs, where each SOLP
program is a set of n-social rules.
A SOLP program is positive if no NAF symbol not occurs in it. For the sake of
presentation we refer, in the following sections, to ground (i.e., variable-free) SOLP
programs – the extension to the general case is straightforward.
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3 Semantics of SOLP programs
In this section we introduce the Social Semantics, i.e. the semantics of a collection
of SOLP programs. We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts
of logic programming (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991; Baral 2003).
We start by introducing the notion of interpretation for a single SOLP program.
An interpretation for a ground (SOLP)4 program P is a subset of Var(P), where
Var(P) is the set of atoms appearing in P . A positive literal a (resp. a negative
literal not a) is true w.r.t. an interpretation I if a ∈ I (resp. a /∈ I ); otherwise it is
false. A rule is true w.r.t. I if its head is true or its body is false w.r.t. I .
Recall that, for each traditional logic program Q , the immediate consequence
operator TQ is a function from 2
Var(Q) to 2Var(Q) defined as follows. For each
interpretation I ⊆ Var(Q), TQ (I ) consists of the set of all heads of rules in Q
whose bodies are true w.r.t. I . An interpretation I is a fixpoint of a logic program
Q if I is a fixpoint of the associated transformation TQ , i.e., if TQ (I ) = I .
The set of all fixpoints of Q is denoted by FP(Q).
Before defining the intended models of our semantics, we need some preliminary
definitions.
Let P be a SOLP program. We define the autonomous reduction of P , denoted
by A(P), the program obtained from P by removing all the SCs from the rules
in P . The intuitive meaning is that in case the program P represents the social
behaviour of an agent, then A(P) represents the behaviour of the same agent in
case he decides to operate independently of the other agents.
Definition 4
Autonomous immediate consequence operator, applied to the SOLP program P
Given a SOLP program P and an interpretation I ⊆ Var(A(P)), let TR(A(P)) be
the set of tolerance rules in A(P) and Var∗(A(P)) be the set Var(A(P))\{okay(p) |
okay(p) ∈ Var(A(P))} ∪ {p | okay(p) ∈ Var(A(P))}. The autonomous immediate
consequence operator ATP is the function from 2
Var∗(A(P)) to 2Var
∗(A(P)), defined
as follows:
ATP(I ) = {head(r) | r ∈ A(P) \ TR(A(P)) ∧ body(r) is true w.r.t. I } ∪
{a | head(r) = okay(a) ∧ r ∈ TR(A(P)) ∧ (body(r) ∧ a) is true w.r.t. I }.
Observe that ATP , when applied to an interpretation I , extends the classical
immediate consequence operator TP , by collecting not only heads of non-tolerance
rules whose body is true w.r.t. I , but also each atom a occurring as okay(a) in the
head of some rule such that both a and the rule body are true w.r.t. I .
Definition 5
An interpretation I for a SOLP program P is an autonomous fixpoint of P if I is
a fixpoint of the associated transformation ATP , i.e. if ATP(I ) = I . The set of all
autonomous fixpoints of P is denoted by AFP(P).
4 We insert SOLP into brackets since the definition is the same as for traditional logic programs.
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Observe that by means of the autonomous fixpoints of a given SOLP program
P we represent the mental states of the corresponding agent, assuming that every
social condition in P is not taken into account.
Example 7
Consider the following SOLP program P :
okay(a) ← b, [1, ]{c}
b ← [2, 4]{d}
It is easy to see that AFP(P) = {{b}, {a, b}}, i.e. the interpretations I1 = {b}
and I2 = {a, b} are the autonomous fixpoints of P , since it holds that ATP(I1) = I1
and ATP(I2) = I2.
Definition 6
Given a SOLP collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn}, let Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be a SOLP program
of C and L be a set of atoms. The labelled version of L w.r.t. Pi , denoted by (L)Pi
is the set {aPi | a ∈ L}. Each element of (L)Pi is referred to as a labelled atom
w.r.t. Pi .
Example 8
Given a SOLP program P1 of a SOLP collection C , if L = {a, b, c}, then (L)P1 =
{aP1 , bP1 , cP1}, where the program identifier P1 indicates the associated SOLP
program.
Now we introduce the concept of social interpretation, devoted to representing
the mental states of the collectivity described by a given SOLP collection and
then we give the definition of truth for both literals and SCs w.r.t. a given social
interpretation. To this aim, the classical notion of interpretation is extended by
means of program identifiers introducing a link between atoms of the interpretation
and programs of the SOLP collection.
Definition 7
Let C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} be a SOLP collection. A social interpretation for C is a set
I¯ = (I 1)P1 ∪ · · · ∪ (I
n)Pn , where I
j is an interpretation for Pj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) and
(I j )Pj is the labelled version of I
j w.r.t. Pj (see Definition 6).
Example 9
Given C = {P1,P2,P3}, I 1 = {a, b, c}, I 2 = {a, d , e} and I 3 = {b, c, d}, where
I j is an interpretation for Pj (1 ≤ j ≤ 3), then I¯ = {aP1 , bP1 , cP1 , aP2 , dP2 ,
eP2 , bP3 , cP3 , dP3} is a social interpretation for C .
We define now the notion of truth for literals, SCs and social rules, respectively.
Let C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} be a SOLP collection. Given a social interpretation I¯ for
C and a positive literal a ∈
⋃
P∈C Var(P), a (resp. not a) is true for Pj (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
w.r.t. I¯ if aPj ∈ I¯ (resp. aPj /∈ I¯ ); otherwise it is false.
Because of the recursive nature of SCs, before giving the definition of truth for a
SC s , we introduce a way to identify s (and also every SC nested in s) occurring in
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a given rule r of a SOLP program P . To this aim, we first define a function which
returns, for a given SC, its nesting depth.
Given a SC s , we define the function depth as follows:
depth(s) =
{
depth(s ′) + 1 if ∃s ′ | s ∈ skel(s ′)
0 otherwise.
Given a SOLP program P , a social rule r ∈ P and an integer n ≥ 0, we define
the set MSC 〈P,r ,n〉 = {s | s is a SC occurring in r ∧ depth(s) = n}, i.e. the set in-
cluding all the SCs having a given depth n and occurring in a social rule r of a
SOLP program P . Observe that, in case the parameter n is zero, then MSC 〈P,r ,0〉
denotes the set of SCs as they appear in the rule r of P .
Example 10
Let a ← [1, 8]{a, [3, 6]{b, [P2]{c, d}}}, [2, 3]{e, f } be a rule r in a SOLP program P1.
Then:
MSC 〈P,r ,0〉 = { [1, 8]{a, [3, 6]{b, [P2]{c, d}}}, [2, 3]{e, f } },
MSC 〈P,r ,1〉 = { [3, 6]{b, [P2]{c, d}} },
MSC 〈P,r ,2〉 = { [P2]{c, d} },
MSC 〈P,r ,3〉 = ∅.
Given a SOLP program P , we define the set MSCP =
⋃
r∈P MSC
〈P,r ,0〉.
MSCP is the set of all the SCs (with depth 0) occurring in P .
Now we provide the definition of truth of a SC w.r.t. a given social interpretation
and, subsequently, the definition of truth of a social rule.
Definition 8
Let C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} be a SOLP collection, C
′ ⊆ C and Pj ∈ C
′. Given a social
interpretation I¯ for C and an n-SC s ∈ MSCPj , we say that s is true for Pj in C
′
w.r.t. I¯ if it holds that either:
(1) cond(s) = [Pk ] ∧
∃Pk ∈ C ′ | ∀a ∈ content(s), a is true for Pk w.r.t. I¯ , or
(2) cond(s) = [l , h] ∧
∃D ⊆ C ′ \ {Pj} | l ≤ |D | ≤ h ∧
∀a ∈ content(s), ∀P ∈ D , a is true for P w.r.t. I¯ ∧
∀s ′ ∈ skel(s) ∃D ′ ⊆ D | s ′ is true for Pj in D ′ w.r.t. I¯ ,
where l , h are integers and Pk is a SOLP program.
If C ′ = C , then we simply say that s is true for Pj w.r.t. I¯ . An n-SC not true
for Pj (in C
′) w.r.t. I¯ is false for Pj (in C
′) w.r.t. I¯ .
Finally, the NAF of a n-SC s , not s , is true (resp. false) for Pj (in C
′) w.r.t. I¯
if s is false (resp. true) for Pj (in C
′) w.r.t. I¯ .
Informally, given a SC s included in Pj , s is true for Pj w.r.t. a social interpretation
I¯ if a single SOLP program Pk (resp. a set D of SOLP programs not including Pj )
exists such that all the elements in content(s) are true for Pk w.r.t. I¯ (resp. for
every program P ∈ D w.r.t. I¯ , and such that every element in skel(s) is true for
Pj w.r.t. I¯ ). Observe that the truth of property(s) is possibly defined recursively,
since s may contain nested SCs.
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Once the notion of truth of SCs has been defined, we are able to define the notion
of truth of a social rule w.r.t. a social interpretation.
Let C be a SOLP collection and P ∈ C . Given a social interpretation I¯ for C and
a social rule r in P , the head of r is true w.r.t. I¯ if either (i) (head(r) = a) ∧ (a
is true for P w.r.t. I¯ ), or (ii) (head(r) = okay(a)) ∧ (a is true for P w.r.t. I¯ ).
Moreover, the body of r is true w.r.t. I¯ if each element of body(r) is true for P
w.r.t. I¯ . Finally, the social rule r is true w.r.t. I¯ if its head is true w.r.t. I¯ or its
body is false w.r.t. I¯ .
Given a SOLP collection {P1, · · · ,Pn}, we define the set of candidate social in-
terpretations for P1, · · · ,Pn as
U(P1, · · · ,Pn) =
{
(F 1)P1 ∪ · · · ∪ (F
n)Pn | F
i ∈ AFP(Pi) ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n
}
,
where, recall, AFP(Pi) is the set of autonomous fixpoints of the SOLP program
Pi (introduced in Definition 5) and by (F i )P (1 ≤ i ≤ n) we denote the labelled
version of F i w.r.t. P (see Definition 6).
The set U(P1, · · · ,Pn) represents all the configurations obtained by combining
the autonomous (i.e. without considering the social conditions) mental states of the
agents corresponding to the programs P1, · · · ,Pn . Each candidate social interpre-
tation is a candidate intended model. The intended models are then obtained by
enabling the social conditions.
Now, we are ready to give the definition of intended model w.r.t. the Social
Semantics.
Definition 9
Given a SOLP collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} and a social interpretation I¯ for C ,
let V¯ be the set (Var(P1))P1 ∪ · · · ∪ (Var(Pn))Pn and TR(Pi) be the set of
tolerance rules of Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The social immediate consequence operator STC
is a function from 2V¯ to 2V¯ defined as follows:
STC (I¯ ) = {aP | P ∈ C ∧ r ∈ P \ TR(P) ∧ head(r) = a ∧
body(r) is true w.r.t I¯ } ∪
{aP | P ∈ C ∧ r ∈ TR(P) ∧ head(r) = okay(a) ∧
a is true for P w.r.t I¯ ∧ body(r) is true w.r.t I¯ }.
A candidate social interpretation I¯ ∈ U(P1, · · · ,Pn) for C is a social model of C
if STC (I¯ ) = I¯ .
Social models are defined as fixpoints of the operator STC . Given a social inter-
pretation I¯ , STC (I¯ ) contains:
1. for each program P in the SOLP collection C , the labelled versions (w.r.t.
P) of the heads of non-tolerance rules, such that the body is true w.r.t. I¯
(According to Definition 8, all the SCs included in the body are checked
w.r.t. the given social interpretation I¯ ).
2. for each program P in the SOLP collection C , the labelled versions (w.r.t. P)
of the arguments of the predicates okay occurring in the heads of tolerance
rules, such that both the rule body is true w.r.t. I¯ and the predicate argument
is true for P w.r.t. I¯ .
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Observe that the social immediate consequence operator STC works differently
from the autonomous immediate consequence operator ATP (see Definition 4), since
the former exploits all the programs – and the social conditions included – of a given
SOLP collection C , while the latter operates only within a given program P , where
the social conditions have been removed.
Definition 10
Given a SOLP collection {P1, · · · ,Pn}, the Social Semantics of P1, · · · ,Pn is the set
SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) = {M¯ | M¯ ∈ U(P1, · · · ,Pn) ∧ M¯ is a social model of P1, · · · ,Pn}.
SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) is the set of all social models of P1, · · · ,Pn .
Now, we introduce an important property holding for social models, i.e. they are
supported in the associated SOLP collection. The next definition gives the notion
of supportness for a social model.
Definition 11
Given a SOLP collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} and a social modelM ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn),
M is supported in C if ∀P ∈ C , ∀a ∈ Var(P1) ∪ · · · ∪ Var(Pn), in case aP ∈ M ,
then at least one of the following holds:
(1) ∃r | r ∈ P ∧ head(r) = a ∧ body(r) is true w.r.t. M ;
(2) ∃r | r ∈ P ∧ head(r) = okay(a) ∧ a is true for P w.r.t M ∧ body(r) is true
w.r.t M .
The property is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1
Given a SOLP collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn}, ∀M ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn), M is sup-
ported in C .
Proof
By contradiction, assume that M ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) and M is not supported in
C . As a consequence,
∃P , ∃a | P ∈ C ∧ a ∈
⋃
P∈C
Var(P) ∧ aP ∈ M and both the following conditions hold:
(1) ∀r ∈ P , it holds that head(r) = a ⇒ body(r) is false w.r.t. M ;
(2) ∀r ∈ P , it holds that head(r) = okay(a)⇒ a is false for P w.r.t. M ∧ body(r)
is false w.r.t. M .
It is easy to see that, according to Definition 9 (page 12), aP 6∈ STC (M ). Now,
since, according to the hypothesis, aP ∈ M , it holds that STC (M ) 6= M . Thus M
is not a social model and we have reached a contradiction.
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Example 11
Consider the following SOLP collection C = {P1,P2}:
P1 : a ← b, [P2]{c} (r1)
P2 : ← c (r2)
It holds that AFP(P1) = {{a, b}, ∅}, AFP(P2) = {∅}. Thus, there exist two
candidate social interpretations, namely I1 = {aP1 , bP1}, I2 = ∅.
Since both body(r1) and body(r2) are false w.r.t. I1, it holds that STC (I1) = ∅.
As a consequence, I1 is not a social model of the SOLP collection C . Concerning
the social interpretation I2 it is easy to see that STC (I2) = ∅. Hence, I2 is a social
model of the SOLP collection C .
Now, consider a slightly different SOLP collection C ′ = {P ′1,P
′
2}:
P ′1 : a ← b, [P
′
2]{c} (r
′
1)
P ′2 : c ← (r
′
2)
It holds that: AFP(P ′1) = {{a, b}, ∅}, AFP(P
′
2) = {{c}}. Thus, we can build the
following candidate social interpretations: I1 = {aP′
1
, bP′
1
, cP′
2
} and I2 = {cP′
2
}.
Now, since STC ′(I1) = {aP′
1
, cP′
2
} and {aP′
1
, cP′
2
} 6= I1, I1 is not a social model
of the collection C ′ = {P ′1,P
′
2}. Finally, STC ′(I2) = I2, hence I2 is a social model
of C ′. It is easy to see that I2 is supported in C
′.
Now, by means of a complete example, we illustrate the notions introduced above.
Example 12
Three agents are represented by the SOLP collection C = {P1,P2,P3} next:
P1 : go party ← [2, ]{go party , [1, ]{guitar}}
P2 : go party ← [P3]{go party}
guitar ← not bad weather , go party
P3 : go party ← not bad weather
The intended meaning of the above SOLP programs is the following: agent P1
goes to the party only if there are at least other two agents which go there and such
that at least one of them brings the guitar with him. Agent P2 goes to the party
only if agent P3 goes too. Moreover, in case agent P2 goes and the weather is not
bad, then he thinks it is safe to bring the guitar with him. Finally, agent P3 goes
to the party if there is not evidence of bad weather.
It is easy to see that SOS(P1,P2,P3) = {I¯ }, where I¯ is the intended model of
the collection C and I¯ = {go partyP1 , go partyP2 , guitarP2 , go partyP3}.
Indeed, it holds that AFP(P1) = {{go party}}, AFP(P2) = {{go party, guitar}}
and AFP(P3) = {{go party}}. Now, note that the candidate social interpretation
I¯ is a social model of C , since it holds that STC (I¯ ) = I¯ . Finally, it is easy to see
that I¯ is supported in C .
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4 Translation to Logic Programming with Aggregates
In this section we give the translation from SOLP under the Social Semantics to
logic programming with aggregates5 under the Stable Model Semantics. We assume
that the reader is familiar with the Stable Model Semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988).
Given a traditional logic program P , we denote by SM (P) the set of all the stable
models of P . For the sake of presentation, the most complicated proofs are placed
in Appendix A.
Our goal is the following: given a collection of SOLP programs we have to generate
a single LPA program whose stable models are in one-to-one correspondence with
the social models of the collection. To this aim we perform the two following tasks:
(a) we generate a LPA program by means of a suitable transformation of all the
SCs occurring in the SOLP programs of the collection; (b) we obtain another logic
program by processing the original SOLP programs in such a way that the SCs
are replaced by suitable atoms. Finally, we merge the two programs obtained from
tasks (a) and (b) into a single LPA program. At the end of the section, we present
a comprehensive example (Example 13) describing the whole translation process.
Next we describe how task (a) is performed. The first step is the translation of a
single SC and the extension of such a translation to all the SCs included in a social
rule, a SOLP program and a SOLP collection, respectively. As a result of task (a),
a single LPA program is generated which represents the translation of the social
conditions occurring in the SOLP collection. In order to have fresh literals that
allow us to encode – in such a program – the truth of social conditions, we need a
mechanism to generate auxiliary atoms that are in one-to-one correspondence with
the social conditions occurring in a SOLP program.
Definition 12
Given a SOLP program P , we define USCP =
⋃
r∈P
⋃
n≥0MSC
〈P,r ,n〉. Moreover,
let Lρ and Lg be two sets of literals such that both (1) Var(P), Lρ, and Lg are
disjoint sets and (2) |Lρ| = |Lg | = |USCP |. We define two one-to-one mappings:
ρ : USCP → Lρ and g : USCP → Lg .
Observe that, according to the definition of the set MSC 〈P,r ,n〉 (see page 11),
USCP is the set of all the SCs (at any nesting depth) in P . Thus, given a SC s
included in a SOLP program P , the mapping ρ (resp. g), returns the auxiliary atom
ρ(s) (resp. the predicate g(s)) such that it is fresh, i.e. it does not occur in P . We
will explain next how ρ(s) and g(s) are exploited by the translation process.
The following definition enables the translation of a single social condition s of a
given program P of a SOLP collection C . Observe that this definition is recursive in
order to produce the translation of every social condition nested in s . Such a trans-
lation produces two sets of rules that we reference as GUESSP(s) and CHECKP (s),
respectively. Informally, the rules in the set GUESSP(s) aim at verifying proper-
ties concerning atoms belonging to other SOLP programs different from P . These
5 We choose the syntax of the non-disjunctive fragment of DLPA (Dell’Armi et al. 2003), denoted
as LPA in the sequel of the section. The DLV system (Leone et al. 2002) can be used to compute
the social models of the SOLP programs.
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properties are then checked according to the selection condition of s (i.e. cond(s))
by means of the rules included in the set CHECKP (s).
In the definition, ρ(s)P denotes the atom ρ labelled atom w.r.t. P (see Defini-
tion 6) and it is derived in case the social condition s is true for P in C w.r.t. a
given social interpretation. With a little abuse of notation, (g(s))(x )P denotes the
predicate g(s) labelled w.r.t. P , having argument x .
Definition 13
Given a SOLP collection SP = {P1, · · · ,Pn}, an integer j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), a SOLP
program Pj ∈ SP and a social condition s ∈ USCPj , we define the SC translation
of s as the LPA program ΨPj (s) = GUESSPj (s) ∪ CHECKPj (s), where both
GUESSPj (s) =
=


{(g(s))(k)Pj ←
∧
b∈content(s) bPk }, if cond(s) = [Pk] ∧ (1 ≤ k ≤ n),
{(g(s))(i)Pj ←
∧
b∈content(s) bPi ∧∧
s′∈skel(s) ρ(s
′)Pj | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} ∪⋃
s′∈skel(s)GUESS
Pj (s ′), if cond(s) = [l, h],
CHECKPj (s) =
=


{ρ(s)Pj ← (g(s))(k)Pj }, if cond(s) = [Pk] ∧ (1 ≤ k ≤ n),
{ρ(s)Pj ← l ≤ #count{K : (g(s))(K )Pj ,K 6= j} ≤ h} ∪⋃
s′∈skel(s)CHECK
Pj (s ′), if cond(s) = [l, h]
and #count denotes an aggregate function which returns the cardinality of a set of
literals satisfying some conditions (Dell’Armi et al. 2003).
The reader may find an instance of application of the above transformation in
the final example (Example 13, page 22 ). Now, by means of the next definition,
we extend the scope of the above translation to a social rule, a SOLP program and
a SOLP collection.
Definition 14
Given a SOLP program P , a social rule r ∈ P and a SOLP collection {P1, · · · ,Pn},
we define:
1. the SC translation of r as the LPA program TP (r) =
⋃
s∈MSCP Ψ
P(s);
2. the SC translation of P as the LPA program W P =
⋃
r∈P T
P (r);
3. the SC translation of the collection as the LPA program C (P1, · · · ,Pn) =⋃
1≤i≤n W
Pi .
Observe that given a SOLP program P , for any classical rule r ∈ P , TP (r) = ∅.
As a consequence, for any program P with no social rules, it holds that W P = ∅.
C (P1, · · · ,Pn) denotes the LP
A program obtained from the processing of all the
SCs included in the SOLP collection {P1, · · · ,Pn}. The generation of C (P1, · · · ,Pn)
is the final step of the task (a) within the whole translation machinery.
Now, we describe task (b). We introduce a suitable mapping from SOLP programs
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to traditional logic programs6, and then we apply such a transformation to each
SOLP program in a given SOLP collection. Finally, we combine the traditional logic
programs so obtained into a single program.
Before introducing the mapping, we need a preliminary processing of all tolerance
rules in a SOLP program. This is done by means of the following transformation:
Definition 15
Given a SOLP program P , we define the SOLP program Pˆ = P \TR(P) ∪ {p ←
p ∧ body(r) | r ∈ TR(P) ∧ head(r) = okay(p)}.
Note that Pˆ is obtained from P by replacing each tolerance rule okay(p) ← body
with the rule p ← p, body.
The next step is giving a mapping from a SOLP program to a traditional logic
program.
Definition 16
Let P be a SOLP program. We define the program Γ′(Pˆ) over the set of atoms
Var(Γ′(Pˆ)) = {aP | a ∈ Var(A(Pˆ))} ∪ {a′P | a ∈ Var(A(Pˆ))} ∪ {saP | a ∈
Var(A(Pˆ))} ∪ {failP} as Γ
′(Pˆ) = S ′1(Pˆ) ∪ S
′
2(Pˆ) ∪ S
′
3(Pˆ), where S
′
1(Pˆ), S
′
2(Pˆ)
and S ′3(Pˆ) are defined as follows:
S ′1(Pˆ) = {aP ←not a
′
P | a ∈ Var(A(Pˆ))} ∪ {a
′
P ←not aP | a ∈ Var(A(Pˆ))},
S ′2(Pˆ) = {saP ← b
1
P , · · · , b
n
P , ρ(s1)P , · · · , ρ(sm)P |
a ← b1, · · · bn , s1, · · · , sm ∈ P},
S ′3(Pˆ) = {failP ←not failP , saP ,not aP | a ∈ Var(A(Pˆ))}∪
{failP ←not failP , aP ,not saP | a ∈ Var(A(Pˆ))}
where A() is the autonomous reduction operator (see page 9).
In words, given a SOLP program P , first a program Pˆ is produced (according
to Definition 15) such that all the predicates okay() occurring in it are suitably
translated. Then, according to Definition 16, three sets of standard logic rules are
generated from Pˆ , referenced as S ′1(Pˆ), S
′
2(Pˆ) and S
′
3(Pˆ). Observe that atoms occur-
ring in these sets are labelled w.t.r. the source program P in order not to generate
name mismatch in the final merging phase. Informally, the set S ′1(Pˆ) guesses atoms
that are candidates to be included in a social model. By means of the rules included
in the set S ′2(Pˆ), atoms that are supported by a social rule are inferred. The atoms
denoted by ρ(si)P (1 ≤ i ≤ m) are in one-to-one correspondence with those gen-
erated by W P (see Definition 14) and represent the social conditions occurring in
P . Finally, the set S ′3(Pˆ) ensures that an atom is derived by means of some rule in
S ′2(Pˆ) iff it is also guessed by some rule in S
′
1(Pˆ).
The next definition introduces a logic program representing the translation of the
whole SOLP collection.
6 Note that, differently from task (a), the logic program here generated do not contain aggregates.
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Definition 17
Given a SOLP collection {P1, · · · ,Pn}, we define the program P
′
u =
⋃
1≤i≤n Γ
′(Pˆi).
P ′u is obtained by combining the translations of all the SOLP programs in a
given SOLP collection, where the social conditions are replaced by ρ-atoms. The
generation of P ′u concludes task (b) of the translation process. Then, the program
P ′u is merged with the LP
A program C (P1, · · · ,Pn) – obtained as a result of task
(a) – in order to enable the social conditions (recall that C (P1, · · · ,Pn) contains
the ρ-atoms as heads of rules, thus allowing the activation of some rule bodies in
P ′u). Finally, the social models of the SOLP collection {P1, · · · ,Pn} can be found
by computing the stable models of the logic program P ′u ∪C (P1, · · · ,Pn).
Once we have described how the translation mechanism proceeds, we need to
demonstrate that it is sound and complete. To this aim, we have to prove the
following results:
(1) The ρ-atoms occurring in C (P1, · · · ,Pn) are in one-to-one correspondence
with true SCs for {P1, · · · ,Pn}.
(2) A one-to-one correspondence exists between the social models of P1, · · · ,Pn
and the stable models of the LPA program P ′u ∪C (P1, · · · ,Pn).
First, we prove item (1) above.
Lemma 1
Given a SOLP collection SP = {P1, · · · ,Pn}, an integer j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), a SOLP
program Pj ∈ SP , a social interpretation I¯ for SP and a SC s ∈ MSCPj , it holds
that s is true for Pj w.r.t. I¯ iff ∃M ∈ SM (C (P1, · · · ,Pn) ∪ Q) s.t. ρ(s)Pj ∈ M ,
where Q = {a ←| a ∈ I¯ }.
Proof
See Appendix A.
Intuitively, a given social interpretation I¯ will infer rule heads in C (P1, · · · ,Pn).
These are either labelled ρ-atoms or labelled g-predicates. Lemma 1 states that
the ρ-atoms occurring in C (P1, · · · ,Pn) are in one-to-one correspondence with true
social conditions. Now, since those ρ-atoms occur also in rule bodies of P ′u , in order
to replace the corresponding SCs (recall Definitions 16 and 17), they contribute to
infer rule heads in P ′u , which represent elements in a social model of the collection
{P1, · · · ,Pn}.
Our intention is to compute the social models of P1, · · · ,Pn in terms of the stable
models of the logic program P ′u ∪ C (P1, · · · ,Pn)
7. Thus, we must prove item (2).
To this aim, let us recall from (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002) some definitions and
results that we shall use later.
Definition 18 (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002)
Let P be a traditional logic program and M ⊆ Var(P). We denote by [M ]P the set
{aP | a ∈ M } ∪ {a′P | a ∈ Var(P) \M } ∪ {saP | a ∈ M }.
7 This can be efficiently accomplished by using the DLV system (Leone et al. 2002)
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Definition 19 (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002)
Let P be a positive program. We define the program Γ(P) over the set of atoms
Var(Γ(P)) = {aP | a ∈ Var(P)}∪{a′P | a ∈ Var(P)}∪{saP | a ∈ Var(P)}∪{failP}
as the union of the sets of rules S1, S2 and S3, defined as follows:
S1 = {aP ←not a
′
P | a ∈ Var(P)} ∪ {a
′
P ←not aP | a ∈ Var(P)}
S2 = {saP ← b1P , · · ·, b
n
P | a ← b1, . . . bn ∈ P}
S3 = {failP ←not failP , saP ,not aP | a ∈ Var(P)}∪
{failP ←not failP , aP ,not saP | a ∈ Var(P)}.
Note that Definition 16 (introducing Γ′) can be viewed as an extension of the
above definition, since the former takes into account social conditions, while the
latter does not. In fact, the transformations Γ′ and Γ produce the same result in
case of programs with no social conditions.
Proposition 1
Given a SOLP program P , it holds that Γ′(A(Pˆ)) = Γ(A(Pˆ)).
Proof
Since A(Pˆ) contains no social condition, it is easy to see that, according to Defi-
nitions 16 and 19 (pages 17 and 19), S ′1(A(Pˆ)) = S1(A(Pˆ)), S
′
2(A(Pˆ)) = S2(A(Pˆ))
and S ′3(A(Pˆ)) = S3(A(Pˆ)). As a consequence, Γ
′(A(Pˆ)) = Γ(A(Pˆ)).
Lemma 2 (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002)
Let P be a traditional logic program. Then
SM (Γ(P)) =
⋃
F∈FP(P)
{[F ]P}.
Once we have recalled the results from (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002), we intro-
duce some more results that we shall use in order to prove item (2).
Proposition 2
Let P be a SOLP program. Then FP(A(Pˆ)) = AFP(P).
Proof
First observe that, given a SOLP program P , it holds that A(Pˆ) = Qˆ where Q =
A(P), i.e. the result of the joint application of the two operators A() and ˆ is
invariant w.r.t. to the order of application. In fact, according to the definitions of
both A() (see page 9) and ˆ (see Definition 15 on page 17), it is easy to see that
the former operates only on social conditions, while the latter does not, since it
operates on both standard atoms and okay predicates. Thus, the two operators
have disjoint application domains. Hence, the order of application is not relevant.
As a result it holds that, FP(A(Pˆ)) = FP(Qˆ) where Q = A(P) and, according
to the traditional definition of fixpoint of a logic program (page 9), FP(Qˆ) = {X |
TQˆ (X ) = X ∧ X ∈ 2
Var(Qˆ)}.
Now, according to the definition of the classical immediate consequence operator
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(page 9), TQˆ (X ) = {head(r) | r ∈ Qˆ ∧ body(r) is true w.r.t. X }, moreover, accord-
ing to Definition 15 (page 17), Qˆ = Q \TR(Q) ∪ {a ← a, body(r) | r ∈ TR(Q) ∧
head(r) = okay(a)}. As a consequence, TQˆ (X ) =
= {head(r) | r ∈ Q \ TR(Q) ∧ body(r) is true w.r.t. X } ∪
{a | head(r) = okay(a) ∧ r ∈ TR(Q) ∧ (a ∧ body(r)) is true w.r.t. X } =
= ATP(X ) (see Definition 4, page 9).
It is easy to see that FP(A(Pˆ)) = FP(Qˆ) = {X | TQˆ (X ) = X ∧ X ∈ 2
Var(Qˆ)} =
{X | ATP(X ) = X ∧ X ∈ 2Var(A(Pˆ))}.
Now, observe that Var(A(Pˆ)) = Var∗(A(P)) (see Definition 4), since after the
application of the operator ˆ to A(P), each predicate okay(p) is replaced by its
argument p, and, according to Definition 4, for each predicate okay(p) appearing
in A(P), okay(p) does not occur in Var∗(A(P)), but the argument p does.
As a consequence, it holds that {X | ATP(X ) = X ∧ X ∈ 2Var(A(Pˆ))} =
{X | ATP(X ) = X ∧ X ∈ 2Var
∗(A(P))} = AFP(P).
Now we extend Definition 18 and Lemma 2, given in (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002),
to SOLP programs.
Definition 20
Let P be a (SOLP) program andM ⊆ Var(P). We denote by [M ]P the set {aP | a ∈
M } ∪ {a′P | a ∈ Var(A(Pˆ)) \M } ∪ {saP | a ∈ M }.
Given a (SOLP) program P , the operator [ ]P produces a set of auxiliary atoms
labelled w.r.t. P . Those atoms are used in the translation process. Observe that
the above definition extends Definition 18, since in case P is a traditional logic
program, then Var(A(Pˆ)) = Var(P) and thus the two definitions match.
The above results are now exploited in order to prove that, by applying the above
operator [ ]P to the autonomous fixpoints of a given SOLP program P , we obtain
the stable models of the translation of the autonomous version of P .
Lemma 3
Given a SOLP program P , it holds that:
SM (Γ′(A(Pˆ))) =
⋃
F∈AFP(P)
{[F ]P}.
Proof
By virtue of Proposition 1 (page 19), Γ′(A(Pˆ)) = Γ(A(Pˆ)). As a consequence,
SM (Γ′(A(Pˆ))) = SM (Γ(A(Pˆ))). Now, denoting A(Pˆ) by Q , by virtue of Lemma 2
(page 19), SM (Γ(Q)) =
⋃
F∈FP(Q){[F ]Q}. According to Definition 18 (page 18),
[F ]Q = {aQ | a ∈ F} ∪ {a′Q | a ∈ Var(Q) \ F} ∪ {saQ | a ∈ F}.
Now, recall that Q = A(Pˆ). Q represents the SOLP program P , after the appli-
cation of both operators ˆ and A(). As a consequence, atoms in [F ]Q are labelled
w.r.t. P . Observe that atoms in Γ′(A(Pˆ)) are labelled w.r.t. P too. Therefore,
with a little abuse of notation, we can write [F ]Q = {aP | a ∈ F} ∪ {a′P | a ∈
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Var(A(Pˆ)) \ F} ∪ {saP | a ∈ F} = [F ]P , according to Definition 20 (page 20) and
since Q is a traditional logic program.
Now, we have obtained that SM (Γ(A(Pˆ))) =
⋃
F∈FP(A(Pˆ)){[F ]P}.
Since, by virtue of Proposition 2 (page 19), FP(A(Pˆ)) = AFP(P), it results that⋃
F∈FP(A(Pˆ))
{[F ]P} =
⋃
F∈AFP(P)
{[F ]P}.
Now we extend Lemma 3 to a whole SOLP collection, but first let us recall the
following result from (Eiter et al. 1997).
Lemma 4 (Eiter et al. 1997)
Let P = P1 ∪ P2 be a program such that Var(P1) ∩ Var(P2) = ∅. Then
SM (P) =
⋃
M1∈SM (P1),M2∈SM (P2)
{M1 ∪M2}.
Lemma 5
Given a SOLP collection {P1, · · · ,Pn}, consider the following sets:
(1) Pu =
⋃
1≤i≤n Γ
′(A(Pˆi)),
(2) SM (Pu), and
(3) B =
{
{(F 1)P1 ∪ (G
1)P1}
⋃
· · ·
⋃
{(Fn)Pn ∪ (G
n)Pn } |
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ n F i ∈ AFP(Pi) ∧ (G i)Pi = [F
i ]Pi \ (F
i )Pi
}
.
It holds that SM (Pu) = B .
Proof
For each i and j such that 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, according to Definition 16 (page 17), it
holds that Var(Γ′(A(Pˆi))) ∩ Var(Γ′(A(Pˆj ))) = ∅. It is easy to see that:
SM (Pu) = SM (
⋃
1≤i≤n Γ
′(A(Pˆi))) = (by virtue of Lemma 4, page 21)
=
⋃
M 1∈SM (Γ′(A(Pˆ1))),···,M n∈SM (Γ′(A(Pˆn)))
{M 1 ∪ · · · ∪M n}.
Note that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),M i ∈ SM (Γ′(A(Pˆi)) and, by virtue of Lemma 3
(page 20), SM (Γ′(A(Pˆi)) =
⋃
F∈AFP(P){[F ]P}. Thus,⋃
M 1∈SM (Γ′(A(Pˆ1))),···,M n∈SM (Γ′(A(Pˆn )))
{M 1 ∪ · · · ∪M n} =
=
⋃
F1∈AFP(P1),···,Fn∈AFP(Pn )
{[F 1]P1 ∪ · · · ∪ [F
n ]Pn }.
Now, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), let us denote by (G i)Pi the set [F
i ]Pi \ (F
i)Pi . It is
easy to see that: ⋃
F1∈AFP(P1),···,Fn∈AFP(Pn )
{[F 1]P1 ∪ · · · ∪ [F
n ]Pn } =
=
⋃
F1∈AFP(P1),···,Fn∈AFP(Pn )
{{(F 1)P1 ∪ (G
1)P1} ∪ · · · ∪ {(F
n)Pn ∪ (G
n)Pn }} =
= B .
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Before proving item (2) we need a further definition, introducing the notion of a
set of ρ-atoms and g-predicates associated, by virtue of Lemma 1, with the social
conditions true for a given SOLP program w.r.t. a social interpretation.
Definition 21
Given a SOLP collection SP = {P1, · · · ,Pn}, a social interpretation I¯ for SP , a
SOLP program P ∈ SP and a SC s ∈ MSCP , let Q = {a ←| a ∈ I¯ }. We define the
set SATP
I¯
(s) =
=
{
h | h = head(r), r ∈ ΨP(s) ∧ (∃M ∈ SM (C (P1, · · · ,Pn) ∪Q) | h ∈ M )
}
.
Observe that in case s is true for P w.r.t. I¯ , SATP
I¯
(s) includes the atom ρ(s)P
and those heads of the rules in ΨP(s) (recall from Definition 13 that ΨP(s) =
GUESSP(s) ∪ CHECKP (s)) corresponding to both the social condition s and the
SCs nested in s .
Finally, we are ready to prove item (2). The next theorem states that a one-to-
one correspondence exists between the social models in SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) and the
stable models of the LPA program P ′u ∪ C (P1, · · · ,Pn).
Theorem 2
Given a SOLP collection SP = {P1, · · · ,Pn}, it holds that A = B , where:
A = SM (P ′u ∪ C (P1, · · · ,Pn)) and
B = {F¯ ∪ G¯ ∪ H¯ |
F¯ =
⋃
1≤i≤n(F
i)Pi ∧ F
i ∈ AFP(Pi) ∧ F¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) ∧ (1)
G¯ =
⋃
1≤i≤n(G
i )Pi ∧ (G
i)Pi = [F
i ]Pi \ (F
i)Pi ∧ (2)
H¯ =
⋃
1≤i≤n(H
i)Pi ∧ (H
i)Pi =
⋃
s∈MSCPi SAT
Pi
F¯
(s)}. (3)
Proof
See Appendix A.
As a result of the above theorem, each stable model X of the program P ′u ∪
C (P1, · · · ,Pn) may be partitioned in three sets: F¯ (representing the corresponding
social model of the SOLP collection), G¯ and H¯ (each including auxiliary liter-
als needed by the translation). Thus, it is possible to find the social models of
P1, · · · ,Pn by a post-processing of the stable models of P ′u ∪C (P1, · · · ,Pn), which
drops the sets G¯ and H¯ .
Example 13
Before closing the section, we present the following logic program P = P ′u ∪
C (P1, · · · ,P4) resulting from the translation of the SOLP collection {P1, · · · ,P4}
presented in Example 1 (see Section 1, Table 1).
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r1 : go weddingP1 ← not go wedding
′
P1
r2 : go wedding
′
P1
← not go weddingP1
r3 : sgo weddingP1 ← ρ 1 1P1
r4 : failP1 ← not failP1 , sgo weddingP1 ,not go weddingP1
r5 : failP1 ← not failP1 , go weddingP1 ,not sgo weddingP1
r6 : go weddingP2 ← not go wedding
′
P2
r7 : go wedding
′
P2
← not go weddingP2
r8 : driveP2 ← not drive
′
P2
r9 : drive
′
P2
← not driveP2
r10 : sgo weddingP2 ← go weddingP2
r11 : sdriveP2 ← driveP2 , go weddingP2
r12 : failP2 ← not failP2 , sgo weddingP2 ,not go weddingP2
r13 : failP2 ← not failP2 , go weddingP2 ,not sgo weddingP2
r14 : failP2 ← not failP2 , sdriveP2 ,not driveP2
r15 : failP2 ← not failP2 , driveP2 ,not sdriveP2
r16 : go weddingP3 ← not go wedding
′
P3
r17 : go wedding
′
P3
← not go weddingP3
r18 : sgo weddingP3 ← ρ 1 1P3
r19 : failP3 ← not failP3 , sgo weddingP3 ,not go weddingP3
r20 : failP3 ← not failP3 , go weddingP3 ,not sgo weddingP3
r21 : g 1 1(2)P1 ← go weddingP2
r22 : g 1 1(3)P1 ← go weddingP3
r23 : ρ 1 1P1 ← 1 ≤ #count{K : g 1 1(K )P1 ,K <> 1} ≤ 3
r24 : g 1 1(2)P3 ← go weddingP2 ,not driveP2
r25 : ρ 1 1P3 ← g 1 1(2)P3
Observe that, according to Definition 16, Γ′(Pˆ1) = S ′1(Pˆ1)∪S
′
2(Pˆ1)∪S
′
3(Pˆ1), where
S ′1(Pˆ1) = {r1, r2}, S
′
2(Pˆ1) = {r3} and S
′
3(Pˆ1) = {r4, r5}. Concerning the SOLP
program P2, Γ′(Pˆ2) = S ′1(Pˆ2) ∪ S
′
2(Pˆ2) ∪ S
′
3(Pˆ2), where S
′
1(Pˆ2) = {r6, r7, r8, r9},
S ′2(Pˆ2) = {r10, r11} and S
′
3(Pˆ2) = {r12, r13, r14, r15}. Γ
′(Pˆ3) = S ′1(Pˆ3) ∪ S
′
2(Pˆ3) ∪
S ′3(Pˆ3), where S
′
1(Pˆ3) = {r16, r17}, S
′
2(Pˆ3) = {r18} and S
′
3(Pˆ3) = {r19, r20}. Finally,
Γ′(Pˆ4) = ∅ since P4 is empty. Recall that P ′u = Γ
′(Pˆ1) ∪ Γ′(Pˆ2) ∪ Γ′(Pˆ3) ∪ Γ′(Pˆ4)
(see Definition 17).
Now, according to Definition 14, C (P1, · · · ,P4) = {W P1 ∪W P2 ∪W P3 ∪W P4},
where W P1 = {r21, r22, r23}, W P2 and W P4 are empty (since P2 and P4 do not
include any social rule) and, finally, W P3 = {r24, r25}. It is easy to check that the
stable models of P correspond, by virtue of Theorem 2, to the social models of the
SOLP programs P1, · · · ,P4.
5 Social Models and Joint Fixpoints
In this section we show that the social semantics extends the JFP semantics (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002).
Basically, COLP programs are logic programs which also contain tolerance rules
(named okay rules) that are rules of the form okay(p) ← body(r). The semantics of
a collection of COLP programs is defined over traditional programs obtained from
the COLP programs by translating each rule of the form okay(p) ← body(r) into
the rule p ← p, body(r). The semantics of a collection P1, · · · ,Pn of COLP pro-
grams is defined in (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002) in terms of joint (i.e., common)
fixpoints (of the immediate consequence operator) of the logic programs obtained
from P1, · · · ,Pn by transforming okay rules occurring in them (as shown above).
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First we need some preliminary definitions and results. We define a translation
from COLP programs (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002) to SOLP programs:
Definition 22
Given a COLP program P and an integer n ≥ 1, the SOLP translation of P is a
SOLP program
σn(P) = {σn(r) | r ∈ P},
where
σn(r) =
{
head(r)← [n − 1, n − 1]head(r), body(r) if r is a classical rule,
okay(p)← [n − 1, n − 1]p, body(r) if r is an okay rule.
Definition 23
Given a COLP program P , let OKAY (P) be the set of all the okay rules included
in P . We define Pˆ = P\OKAY (P)∪{p ← p, body(r) | r ∈ OKAY (P) ∧ head(r) =
okay(p)}.
Informally, for any given COLP program P , Pˆ is a traditional logic program ob-
tained from P by replacing the head of each okay rule with the argument of the
predicate okay and then adding such an argument to the body of the rule.
Lemma 6
Given a COLP program P , then:
∀n ≥ 1 FP(Pˆ) = AFP(σn(P)).
Proof
First, observe that, according to Definition 4 (page 9), all SCs occurring in the
program σn(Pˆ) are discarded in order to compute the autonomous fixpoints. As a
consequence, the equivalence holds for any value of the parameter n. Now, it is easy
to see that the proof follows directly from Definitions 5, 22 and 23 (see page 9, 24
and 24, respectively).
Lemma 7
Let P1, · · · ,Pn be a set of COLP programs and Q1, · · · ,Qn be SOLP programs such
that Qi = σ
n(Pi). Then:
SOS(Q1, · · · ,Qn) = {(F
1)Q1 ∪ · · · ∪ (F
n)Qn | ∀i , j 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, F
i = F j }.
Proof
By contradiction let us assume that
(1) ∃M¯ | M¯ = (F 1)Q1 ∪ · · · ∪ (F
n)Qn ∧ M¯ ∈ SOS(Q1, · · · ,Qn), and
(2) ∃i , j 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n | F i 6= F j ·
Thus, without loss of generality there exists h ∈ F i s.t. hQi ∈ (F
i)Qi and hQj 6∈
(F j )Qj . As a consequence, hQi ∈ M¯ and hQj 6∈ M¯ . Now, we have reached a con-
tradiction because, according to Definitions 10 and 22 (pages 13 and 13), hQi ∈ M¯
only if for each k , (1 ≤ k 6= i ≤ n), hQk ∈ M¯ , thus M¯ 6∈ SOS(Q1, · · · ,Qn)
(contradiction).
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The next theorem states that the JFP semantics is a special case of the social
semantics. JFP(P1, · · · ,Pn) denotes the set of the joint fixpoints of the collection
of COLP programs P1, · · · ,Pn .
Theorem 3
Let P1, · · · ,Pn (n ≥ 1) be COLP programs and C = {Q1, · · · ,Qn} be a collection
of SOLP programs such that Qi = σ
n(Pi). Then:
SOS(Q1, · · · ,Qn) =


⋃
1≤i≤n
(F )Qi | F ∈ JFP(P1, · · · ,Pn)

 .
Proof
(⊇). First, we show that
∀F ∈ JFP(P1, · · · ,Pn),
⋃
1≤i≤n
(F )Qi ∈ SOS(Q1, · · · ,Qn).
By contradiction, let us assume that ∃M¯ =
⋃
1≤i≤n(F )Qi | M¯ 6∈ SOS(Q1, · · · ,Qn).
Thus, there exists an integer j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, such that either:
(1) F 6∈ AFP(Qj ), or
(2) F ∈ AFP(Qj ) ∧ STC (M¯ ) 6= M¯ .
In case (1), by virtue of Lemma 6 (page 24), F 6∈ FP(Pˆj ) which contradicts the
hypothesis that F ∈ JFP(P1, · · · ,Pn).
In case (2), it holds that either:
(a) ∃h,Qj | Qj ∈ C ∧ hQj ∈ M¯ ∧ hQj 6∈ STC (M¯ ), or
(b) ∃h,Qj | Qj ∈ C ∧ hQj 6∈ M¯ ∧ hQj ∈ STC (M¯ ).
If condition (a) occurs, then, for each rule r ∈ Qj , s.t. head(r) = h or head(r) =
okay(h), it results that body(r) is false w.r.t. M¯ , because hQj 6∈ STC (M¯ (recall
Definition 9, page 12).
Now, since h ∈ F and F ∈ AFP(Qj ), according to Definition 22 (page 24), it
holds that for each rule r ∈ Qj , s.t. head(r) = h or head(r) = okay(h), the SC
[n − 1, n − 1]h (introduced by the transformation σ) is false for Qj w.r.t. M¯ .
Thus, according to Definition 8 (page 11), there exists k (1 ≤ k 6= j ≤ n)
s.t. hQk 6∈ M¯ . Now, we have obtained that hQj ∈ M¯ and hQk 6∈ M¯ . Since M¯ =⋃
1≤i≤n(F )Qi and F ∈ JFP(P1, · · · ,Pn), by virtue of Lemma 7 (page 24), we have
reached a contradiction. This concludes the proof in case (2), when condition (a)
holds.
Consider, now, that condition (b) is true in case (2). According to Definition 9
(page 12), there exists r ∈ Qj s.t. head(r) = h or head(r) = okay(h) and body(r)
is true w.r.t. M¯ . As a consequence and according to Definition 22 (page 24), [n −
1, n − 1]h is true for Qj w.r.t. M¯ . Now, according to Definition 8 (page 11), for
each k (1 ≤ k 6= j ≤ n), hQk ∈ M¯ and hQj 6∈ M¯ . Since M¯ =
⋃
1≤i≤n(F )Qi
and F ∈ JFP(P1, · · · ,Pn), by virtue of Lemma 7 (page 24), we have reached a
contradiction. This concludes the proof in case (2).
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(⊆). Now we show that ∀M¯ ∈ SOS(Q1, · · · ,Qn), it holds that both:
(1) M¯ = {
⋃
1≤i≤n(F
i)Qi | ∀i , j (1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n),F
i = F j } and
(2) ∀i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), F i ∈ JFP(P1, · · · ,Pn).
First observe that, condition (1) follows directly from Lemma 7 (page 24).
Now we prove that condition (2) is true. Assume, by contradiction, that F 6∈
JFP(P1, · · · ,Pn), where F = F 1 = F 2 = · · · = Fn (thanks to condition (1)). As
a consequence, there exists j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) s.t. F 6∈ FP(Pˆj ) (recall that ) Pj is
a COLP program. Now, by virtue of Lemma 6 (page 24), F 6∈ AFP(Qj ), where
Qj = σ
n(Pj ). Thus, according to Definition 10 (page 13), FQj 6⊆ M¯ , because FQj
is not an autonomous fixpoint of Qj . This result contradicts condition (1), which
is true, stating that FQj ⊆ M¯ .
6 Complexity Results
In this section we introduce some relevant decision problems with respect to the So-
cial Semantics and discuss their complexity. The analysis is done in case of positive
programs. The extension to the general case is straightforward.
First, we consider the problem of social model existence for a collection of SOLP
programs.
PROBLEM SOSn (social model existence):
Instance: A SOLP collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn}.
Question: Is SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) 6= ∅, i.e., do the programs P1, . . . ,Pn have any
social model?
Theorem 4
The problem SOSn is NP-complete.
Proof
(1. Membership). In order to verify that a set of positive SOLP programs admits
a social model, it suffices to guess a candidate social interpretation I¯ for C and
then to check that STC (I¯ ) = I¯ . Since the latter task is feasible in polynomial time,
then the problem SOSn is in NP.
(2. Hardness). Observe that the problem SOSn generalizes the problem JFP (Buccafurri and Gottlob 2002),
which has been proved to NP-complete. Indeed, in Definition 22 (page 24) a polynomial-
time reduction from JFP to SOSn , i.e. σ
n(P), has been introduced. Moreover, The-
orem 3 (page 25) states that any instance of the problem JFP can be reduced to
an equivalent instance of SOSn , i.e. on those instances the both problems have the
same answers. Thus, we have proven that the problem SOSn is NP-hard. Then the
problem SOSn is NP-complete.
Indeed, the case of non positive programs is straightforward: since it is NP-
complete to determine whether a single non-positive program has a fixpoint, it is
easy to see that the same holds for non-positive SOLP programs and autonomous
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fixpoints. Thus, checking whether a SOLP collection containing at least one non-
positive SOLP program has a social model is trivially NP-hard. Moreover, since
this problem is easily seen to be in NP, it is NP-complete.
Now, we introduce several computationally interesting decision problems associ-
ated with the social semantics. Each of them corresponds to a computational task
involving labeled atom search inside the social models of a SOLP collection.
The traditional approach used for classical non-monotonic semantics of logic pro-
grams, typically addresses the two following problems:
(a) Skeptical Reasoning, i.e. deciding whether an atom x occurs in all the models
of a given program P ;
(b) Credulous Reasoning, i.e. deciding whether an atom x occurs in some model
of a given program P .
Since a social model is a social interpretation, i.e. a set of labeled atoms, we
have to extend the above problems (a) and (b) by introducing a further search
dimension, expressing the sociality degree of the agents represented by the SOLP
collection. More informally, we are also interested in how many SOLP programs a
given atom – occurring as a labeled atom in a social model – is entailed by.
As a consequence, given a collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} of SOLP programs, a
social model M¯ of P1, · · · ,Pn and an atom x , we distinguish two cases. Either:
(1) for each P in C , ∀i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), xPi ∈ M¯ , or
(2) for some P in C , ∃i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ xPi ∈ M¯ .
In words, in case (1) the agents corresponding to the SOLP collection C exhibit
a greater sociality degree – since all of them choose the atom x inside the social
model M¯ – than in case (2), where at least one agent is required to choose x and
thus we observe a more individual agent behaviour.
By combining the problems (a) and (b) with the traditional reasoning tasks
(1) and (2), we obtain the following four decision problems relevant to the social
semantics:
1. PROBLEM SS -SOSn (socially skeptical reasoning):
Instance: A SOLP collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} and an atom x .
Question: Does it hold that, for each M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn), {xP1 , · · · , xPn} ⊆ M¯ ,
i.e. ∀i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), xPi ∈ M¯ ?
In case the answer to such a problem is positive, then it holds that all the agents
always (i.e., in each social model) choose x , since xP occurs in M¯ , for each social
model M¯ and for each SOLP program P . For instance, this kind of reasoning could
be applied by the government of a given country in order to know if all citizens,
modelled as a collection of SOLP programs, pay taxes.
2. PROBLEM IS -SOSn (individually skeptical reasoning):
Instance: A SOLP collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} and an atom x .
Question: Does it hold that, for each M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn), ∃i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n
∧ xPi ∈ M¯ ?
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In case the answer to such a problem is positive, then it holds that always (i.e.,
in every social model) there is at least an agent choosing x , since xP occurs in M¯ ,
for each social model M¯ and for some SOLP program P . This kind of reasoning is
useful, for instance, to test if a given action, represented by x , is always performed by
at least one agent, no matter the agent is. For example, consider a family (modelled
as a SOLP collection) sharing a car. The above kind of reasoning could be used in
order to check whether someone gets gasoline each time the car is used.
3. PROBLEM SC -SOSn (socially credulous reasoning):
Instance: A SOLP collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} and an atom x .
Question: Does it hold that, there exists M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn), such that for
each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), xPi ∈ M¯ , i.e. {xP1 , · · · , xPn} ⊆ M¯ ?
In case the answer to such a problem is positive, then at least one social model
exists whereas all the agents choose x , since xP occurs in M¯ , for some social model
M¯ and for each SOLP program P . As a consequence, a common agreement on
x by the agents may be reached at least in one case (i.e. in one social model).
For instance, this kind of reasoning could be applied in order to check whether
some chance exists that the European Council of Ministers (modelled as a SOLP
collection) unanimously accepts a country as a new member of the European Union.
4. PROBLEM IC -SOSn (individually credulous reasoning):
Instance: A SOLP collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} and an atom x .
Question: Does it hold that, there exist M¯ and j such that (i) M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn)
and (ii) it holds that 1 ≤ j ≤ n ∧ xPj ∈ M¯ ?
In case the answer to such a problem is positive, then it holds that at least one
social model exists whereas at least one agent chooses x , since xP occurs in M¯ ,
for some social model M¯ and for some SOLP program P . In such a case, although
there is no common agreement on x by the agents, it holds that x is chosen by
some of them, at least once (i.e. in one social model). For example, the above
reasoning could be used by a company in order to check whether a given product
is never bought by a group of potential customers (represented by SOLP programs).
The computational complexity of the above problems is stated by the following
theorems.
Theorem 5
The problem SS -SOSn is coNP-complete.
Proof
It suffices to prove that the complementary problem of SS -SOSn is NP-complete.
Such a problem may be described as follows:
Instance: A SOLP collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} and an atom x .
Question: Does it hold that there exist M¯ and j such that (i) M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn)
and (ii) 1 ≤ j ≤ n ∧ xPj 6∈ M¯ ?
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(1. Membership). We need to guess a candidate social interpretation M¯ for C
and, then, to verify that:
(i) M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn), and
(ii) ∃j | 1 ≤ j ≤ n ∧ xPj 6∈ M¯ .
Verifying the above items is feasible in polynomial time. Thus, the complementary
problem of SS -SOSn is in NP.
(2. Hardness). Now we prove that a reduction from the NP-complete problem
SOSn to the complementary problem of SS -SOSn is feasible in polynomial time.
Consider an atom x such that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), x 6∈ Var(Pi). It is easy
to see that SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) 6= ∅ iff there exists M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) such that
{xP1, · · · , xPn} 6⊆ M¯ . Moreover, in case {xP1, · · · , xPn} 6⊆ M¯ , it results that ∃j |
1 ≤ j ≤ n ∧ xPj 6∈ M¯ . Thus, SOSn is polynomially reducible to the complementary
problem of SS -SOSn .
Theorem 6
The problem IS -SOSn is coNP-complete.
Proof
It suffices to prove that the complementary problem of IS -SOSn is NP-complete.
Such a problem may be described as follows:
Instance: A SOLP collection C = {P1, · · · ,Pn} and an atom x .
Question: Does it hold that there exists M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) such that ∀j
(1 ≤ j ≤ n), xPj 6∈ M¯ , i.e. {xP1, · · · , xPn} 6⊆ M¯ ?
(1. Membership). We need to guess a candidate social interpretation M¯ for C
and, then, to verify that:
(i) M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn), and
(ii) {xP1 , · · · , xPn} 6⊆ M¯ .
Verifying the above items is feasible in polynomial time. Thus, the complementary
problem of IS -SOSn is in NP.
(2. Hardness). Now we prove that a reduction from the NP-complete problem
SOSn to the complementary problem of IS -SOSn is feasible in polynomial time.
Consider an atom x such that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), x 6∈ Var(Pi). It is easy
to see that SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) 6= ∅ iff there exists M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) such that
{xP1, · · · , xPn} 6⊆ M¯ . Thus, SOSn is polynomially reducible to the complementary
problem of IS -SOSn .
Theorem 7
The problem SC -SOSn is NP-complete.
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Proof
(1. Membership). We need to guess a candidate social interpretation M¯ for C
and, then, to verify that:
(i) M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn), and
(ii) {xP1 , · · · , xPn} ⊆ M¯ .
Verifying the above items is feasible in polynomial time. Thus, the problem SC -
SOSn is in NP.
(2. Hardness). Now we prove that a reduction from the NP-complete problem
SOSn exists and it is feasible in polynomial time. consider the SOLP collection
C ′ = {τ(P1), · · · , τ(Pn)}, where, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), τ(Pi) is a SOLP program
obtained from Pi as follows:
τ(Pi) = Pi ∪ {x ←},
where it holds that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), x 6∈ Var(Pi). It is easy to see
that SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) 6= ∅ iff for each M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn), there exists M¯ ′ ∈
SOS(τ(P1), · · · , τ(Pn)) such that M¯ ′ = M¯ ∪ {xP1, · · · , xPn}. Thus, SOSn is poly-
nomially reducible to SC -SOSn .
Theorem 8
The problem IC -SOSn is NP-complete.
Proof
(1. Membership). We need to guess a candidate social interpretation M¯ for C
and, then, to verify that:
(i) M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn), and
(ii) ∃j | 1 ≤ j ≤ n ∧ xPj ∈ M¯ .
Verifying the above items is feasible in polynomial time. Thus, the problem IC -
SOSn is in NP.
(2. Hardness). Now we prove that a reduction from the NP-complete problem
SOSn exists and it is feasible in polynomial time. consider the SOLP collection
C ′ = {τ(P1), · · · , τ(Pn)}, where, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), τ(Pi) is a SOLP program
obtained from Pi as follows:
τ(Pi) = Pi ∪ {x ←},
where it holds that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), x 6∈ Var(Pi). It is easy to see
that SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) 6= ∅ iff for each M¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn), there exists M¯ ′ ∈
SOS(τ(P1), · · · , τ(Pn)) such that M¯ ′ = M¯∪{xP1 , · · · , xPn}. Moreover, since {xP1 , · · · ,
xPn} ⊆ M¯
′, there exists j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) such that xPj ∈ M¯
′. Thus, SOSn is polyno-
mially reducible to IC -SOSn .
7 Knowledge Representation with SOLP programs
In this section, we provide interesting examples showing the capability of our lan-
guage of representing common knowledge.
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Example 14 (Seating)
We must arrange a seating for a number n of agents (representing, for instance,
people invited to the wedding party introduced in Example 1), with m tables and
a maximum of c chairs per table. Agents who like each other should sit at the same
table; agents who dislike each other should not sit at the same table. Moreover, an
agent can express some requirements w.r.t. the number and the identity of other
agents sitting at the same table. Assume that the I -th agent is represented by a
predicate agent(I ) and his knowledge base is enclosed in a single SOLP program.
Each program will include both a set of common rules encoding the problem and
the agent’s own requirements. The predicate like(A) (resp. dislike(A)) means that
the agent A is desired (resp. not tolerated) at the same table. table(T ) represents
a table (1 ≤ T ≤ m) and at(T ) expresses the desire to sit at table T . For instance,
the program P1 (which is associated with the agent 1) could be written as follows:
r1 : agent(1) ←
r2 : ← at(T1), at(T2),T1 <> T2
r3 : at(T )← [c, ]{at(T ), agent(P)}, like(P), table(T )
r4 : ← at(T ), [1, ]{at(T ), agent(P)}, dislike(P)
r5 : ← like(P),dislike(P)
r6 : like(2)←
r7 : dislike(3)←
r8 : okay(like(4))←
r9 : ← at(T ), [3, ]{at(T )}
where the rules from r1-r5 are common to all the programs (of course, the argument
of the predicate agent() in r1 is suited to the enclosing program) and the rules r6-r9
express the agent’s own requirements. In detail, the rule r2 states that any agent
cannot be seated at more than one table, the rule r3 means that agent 1 sits at a
particular table T if at least c agents he likes are seating at that table (c is a given
constant). The rule r4 states that it is forbidden that agent 1 shares a table with
at least one or more agents he dislikes.
The rule r5 provides consistency for the predicates like and dislike, while examples
of such predicates are reported in rules r6 and r7. The rule r8 is used to declare that
agent 1 tolerates agent 4, i.e. agent 4 possibly shares a table with agent 1, and finally
the rule r9 means that the agent 1 does not want to share a table with 3 agents or
more. Observe that while the rule r3 generates possible seating arrangements, the
rules r2, r4 and r9 discard those which are not allowed.
Example 15 (Room arrangement)
Consider a house having m rooms. We have to distribute some objects (i.e. furniture
and appliances) over the rooms in such a way that we do not exceed the maximum
number of objects, say c, allowed per room. Constraints about the color and/or
the type of objects sharing the same room can be introduced. We assume that each
object is represented by a single program encoding both the properties and the
constraints we want to meet. Consider the following program:
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r1 : name(cupboard) ←
r2 : type(furniture) ←
r3 : color(yellow)←
r4 : ← at(R1), at(R2),R1 <> R2
r5 : at(R)← [, 2]{at(R), type(appliance), color(yellow),
[1, 1]{name(fridge)}}, room(R)
r6 : at(R)← [, c − 3]{at(R), type(furniture)}, room(R)
r7 : ← at(R), [1, ]{at(R), color(green)}
where the properties of the current object are encoded as predicates representing
the name (fridge, cupboard, table, . . . ), the type (furniture or appliance), the color
and so on (see rules r1-r3). In particular, the rule r4 states that an object may not
be in more than one room, while by means of the rule r5, we allow no more than two
yellow appliances to share the room with the cupboard, provided that one of them
is a fridge. The rule r6 means that we want the cupboard to be in the same room
with any other pieces of furniture, but no more than c − 3, where c (representing
the maximum number of objects per room) is given. Finally, the rule r7 states that
the cupboard cannot share the room with any green object.
Example 16 (FPGA Design)
In this example, we represent an extended version of a well-known problem be-
longing to the setting of FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Arrays) design, namely
placement. FPGAs are generic, programmable digital devices providing, in a single
system, a way for digital designers to access thousands or millions of logic gates
arranged in multilevel structures, referred to as modules, and to program them as
desired by the end user. Placement consists in determining the module positions
within the design area according to given constraints.
Consider a team of n electronic engineers, jointly working on a common FPGA
design. Each of them is responsible for placing a given number of modules inside
the chip design area, which is represented by a square grid of cells. In particular,
each designer must meet a number of constraints concerning either (resp. both) his
own modules or (resp. and) the modules of other designers. Moreover, the total
chip area which is occupied by the modules must either match a given value or be
less than a given value.
This setting can be encoded by a collection of SOLP programs8 C = {Q1, · · · ,Qn ,
P}, where for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), Qi describes designer i ’s requirements, and P
represents an agent aimed to find admissible solutions to the placement problem.
Such solutions are included into the social models of the SOLP collection C . In the
following paragraphs we describe such programs in detail.
We assume that each module is rectangular-shaped and it is described by a
predicatemod(M ,X , Y ), whereM is an identifier and X (resp. Y ) is the horizontal
(resp. vertical) module size measured in grid cells. First, we describe the program
Qi (corresponding to rules r1-r28), encoding designer i ’s placement constraints.
8 Observe that, according to the implementation of the language that relies on DLV
(Leone et al. 2002; Dell’Armi et al. 2003), individual programs of our SOLP collection adopt
the syntax of DLV, allowing both built-in predicates and standard aggregate functions.
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We distinguish among hard and soft constraints, respectively. Hard constraints
are common to each program Qi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and describe the placement problem.
Soft constraints represent both requirements of a single designer on his own mod-
ule’s properties and requirements on the properties of modules owned by another
designer.
Hard Constraints. The following rules encode the placement problem:
r1 : grid(n,n)←
r2 : ← place(B ,X ,Y ), unplaced(B ,X ,Y )
r3 : place(B ,X ,Y )← not unplaced(B ,X ,Y ),mod(B , , ),#int(X ),
#int(Y ),X < XG,Y < YG, grid(XG,YG)
r4 : unplaced(B ,X ,Y )← not place(B ,X ,Y ),mod(B , , ),#int(X ),
#int(Y ),X < XG,Y < YG, grid(XG,YG)
r5 : ← place(B ,X ,Y ),mod(B ,XB ,YB), grid(XG,YG),
XT > XG,+(X ,XB ,XT )
r6 : ← place(B ,X ,Y ),mod(B ,XB ,YB), grid(XG,YG),
YT > YG,+(Y ,YB ,YT )
r7 : ← #count{B : place(B , , ),mod(B , , ),B = B1} = 0,
mod(B1, , )
r8 : ← place(B ,X ,Y ), place(B ,X 1,Y1),X <> X 1
r9 : ← place(B ,X ,Y ), place(B ,X 1,Y1),Y <> Y1
r10 : ← cell(B ,X ,Y ), cell(B1,X ,Y ),B <> B1
r11 : cell(B ,X ,Y )← mod(B ,XB ,YB), place(B ,X 1,Y1),#int(X ),
#int(Y ),X 1 ≤ X ,X < SX ,+(X 1,XB ,SX ),
Y1 ≤ Y ,Y < SY ,+(Y1,YB ,SY )
r12 : ← cell(B ,X ,Y ), [1, ]{cell(B1,X 1,Y1)},X = X 1,Y = Y1
First, the grid sizes are declared (rule r1) and then, after candidate module
positions are guessed (rules r2-r4), several requirements are checked: (i) a module
cannot be placed outside the chip design area (rules r5, r6); (ii) all modules must be
placed (rule r7); (iii) each module can not be placed more than once (rules r8, r9);
(iv) modules owned by the same designer cannot overlap (rule r10). By means of
rule r11 the predicate cell(B ,X ,Y ) is true if module B covers the grid cell at
coordinates X ,Y . Finally, the intended meaning of the social rule r12 is to avoid
overlapping of modules owned by different designers.
Soft Constraints. The following rules describe examples of constraints that de-
signer i can specify on his own module’s properties, i.e. setting either the absolute
module position (rule r13) or that relative to other modules (rules r14-r17). For
instance, rules r14 and r15 specify that both modules 1 and 3 must be placed (a)
on the same row (represented by the coordinate Y), and (b) such that module 1 is
on the left of module 3. Finally, rules r16 and r17 require that module 1 is placed
either 0 or 1 cell far from module 3. Note that the predicate place(B ,X ,Y ) sets
the upper-left corner coordinates of module B to X ,Y .
r13 : place(1, 3, 4)←
r14 : ← place(1,X ,Y ), place(3,X 1,Y1),Y <> Y1
r15 : ← place(1,X ,Y ), place(3,X 1,Y1),X ≥ X 1
r16 : ← place(1,X ,Y ), place(3,X 1,Y1),#int(X ),
mod(1,XB ,YB),+(X ,XM ,X 1),+(XB ,D ,XM ),D < 0
r17 : ← place(1,X ,Y ), place(3,X 1,Y1),#int(X ),
mod(1,XB ,YB),+(X ,XM ,X 1),+(XB ,D ,XM ),D > 1
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In addition, it is possible to encode, by means of social rules, the dependence of
designer i ’s module properties from those of other designers. For instance, given
an integer d , by means of the following rules designer i requires that module 4 is
placed on the same row (rule r18) as designer j ’s module 1 and such that a distance
of exactly d cells exists between them (rules r19, r20).
r18 : ← place(4,X 4,Y 4), [Qj ]{place(1,X 1,Y1)},Y 4 <> Y1·
r19 : ← place(4,X 4,Y 4), [Qj ]{place(1,X 1,Y1)},D <> d ,+(X 4,XM ,X 1),
X 4 ≤ X 1,+(XB4,D ,XM ),mod(4,XB4,YB4)
r20 : ← place(4,X 4,Y 4), [Qj ]{place(1,X 1,Y1)},D <> d ,+(X 1,XM ,X 4),
X 1 ≤ X 4,+(XB1,D ,XM ),mod(1,XB1,YB1)
In order to ensure that all modules are properly spaced, rules r21-r24 (resp. rules
r25-r28) require that modules owned by designer i (resp. owned by designers i and
j such that j 6= i) are mutually spaced by at least k cells, where k is a given integer
constant.
r21 : ← cell(B ,X ,Y ), cell(B1,X 1,Y1),B <> B1,#int(D),+(X ,D ,X 1),D < k
r22 : ← cell(B ,X ,Y ), cell(B1,X 1,Y1),B <> B1,#int(D),+(X 1,D ,X ),D < k
r23 : ← cell(B ,X ,Y ), cell(B1,X 1,Y1),B <> B1,#int(D),+(Y ,D ,Y1),D < k
r24 : ← cell(B ,X ,Y ), cell(B1,X 1,Y1),B <> B1,#int(D),+(Y1,D ,Y ),D < k
r25 : ← cell(B ,X ,Y ), [1, ]{cell(B1,X 1,Y1)},#int(D),+(X ,D ,X 1),D < k
r26 : ← cell(B ,X ,Y ), [1, ]{cell(B1,X 1,Y1)},#int(D),+(X 1,D ,X ),D < k
r27 : ← cell(B ,X ,Y ), [1, ]{cell(B1,X 1,Y1)},#int(D),+(Y ,D ,Y1),D < k
r28 : ← cell(B ,X ,Y ), [1, ]{cell(B1,X 1,Y1)},#int(D),+(Y1,D ,Y ),D < k
Now we describe the SOLP program P (rules r29-r38), representing an agent
which collects from the designers admissible solutions to the placement problem.
Moreover, by means of additional rules (r39-r40), P possibly requires that the place-
ment layout area either is less than or matches a given value.
r29 : pcell(X ,Y )← [1, ]{cell( ,X 1,Y1)},X = X 1,Y = Y1
r30 : exists x lt(W )← pcell(W , ), pcell(W 1, ),W 1 <W
r31 : lowest x(X )← pcell(X , ), not exists x lt(X )
r32 : exists y lt(W )← pcell( ,W ), pcell( ,W 1),W 1 <W
r33 : lowest y(Y )← pcell( ,Y ), not exists y lt(Y )
r34 : exists x ht(W )← pcell(W , ), pcell(W 1, ),W 1 >W
r35 : highest x(X )← pcell( ,X , ), not exists x ht(X )
r36 : exists y ht(W )← pcell( ,W ), pcell( ,W 1),W 1 >W
r37 : highest y(Y )← pcell( ,Y ), not exists y ht(Y )
r38 : design area(A)← ∗(B ,H ,A),+(X 1,B ,X 2),+(Y1,H ,Y2), lowest x(X 1),
highest x(X 2), lowest y(Y1), highest y(Y2)
Social rule r29 collects admissible solutions to the placement problem. The rules
from r30 to r37 are used to represent the smallest rectangle enclosing all the placed
modules. Then, the actual design area is computed by rule r38.
In case an an upper bound b to be satisfied (resp. an exact value s to be matched)
is given, then the following rule r39 (resp. r40) may be added:
r39 : ← design area(A),A > b
(resp. r40 : ← design area(A),A <> s)
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Example 17 (Contextual Reasoning)
It is interesting to observe that SOLP programs can represent a form of Contextual
Reasoning (Ghidini and Giunchiglia 2001).
Although many definitions of the notion of context exist in the Artificial Intel-
ligence literature (McCarthy 1993; Ghidini and Giunchiglia 2001; Bre´zillon 1999),
we can informally say that a context is an environment (i.e. a set of facts and the
logic rules to perform inference with) in which the reasoning takes place.
In particular, in (Ghidini and Giunchiglia 2001) two key principles of contextual
reasoning are stated: locality (the reasoning task uses only a subset of the to-
tal knowledge available) and compatibility (additional constraints among different
contexts may be specified to declare those which are mutually compatible).
Under this perspective, we are interested in representing this feature of common-
sense reasoning, that is, given a problem to be solved, (i) bounding the reasoning
to the knowledge which is strictly needed, the so-called context of the problem, and
(ii), in case the original context is not suitable to reach a solution, enabling the use
of new information provided by other contexts.
It is interesting to note that SOLP programs are well-suited to represent contexts,
since each of them enables reasoning which takes place both locally, i.e. at the level
of the program knowledge base, and at the level of the other programs’ knowledge
bases. Thus, it is easy to model reasoning which involves several different contexts.
For instance, consider a SOLP program P0 (representing the context of the agent
A0) including a social rule of the form
action ← [P1]b1, · · · , [Pn ]bn
meaning that the agent A0 infers the term action if each term bi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is
inferred by the corresponding agent Ai , i.e. bi is part of an autonomous fixpoint of
Pi . This way, the notion of locality is realized by representing each different context
in a separate SOLP program, and the compatibility principle is pursued by suitably
using SCs where member selection conditions identify contexts.
As an example, consider the well-known “Three Wise Men Puzzle”, first intro-
duced in (Konolige 1984).
A king wishes to determine which of his three wise men is the wisest. He arranges them
in a circle so that they can see and hear each other and tells them that he will put a white
or a black spot on each of their foreheads but that at least one spot will be white. He then
repeatedly asks them, “Do you know the colour of your spot?”. What do they answer?
We represent by means of SOLP programs a slightly simpler version of the puzzle,
where only two wise men are involved:
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r1 : color(white)←
r2 : color(black) ←
King (agent K )
r3 : wise man(1..2)←
r4 : put spot(A, black)← not put spot(A,white),wise man(A)
r5 : put spot(A,white)← not put spot(A, black),wise man(A)
r6 : ← #count{S : put spot(S , black)} = N ,
#count{A : wise man(A)} = N ,#int(N )
r7 : ask question(1) ←
r8 : ask question(T2) ← ask question(T1),#succ(T1,T2),#int(T1),#int(T2)
not [1, ]{answer(white,T1), answer(black ,T1)},
Wise man 1 (agent W 1)
r9 : forehead(C )← [K ]{put spot(1,C )}, color(C )
r10 : answer(white, 1)← [K ]{ask question(1)}, [W 2]{forehead(black)}
r11 : answer(black , 1)← [K ]{ask question(1)}, [W 2]{forehead(white),
answer(white, 1)}
r12 : answer(white, 2)← [K ]{ask question(2)}, [W 2]{forehead(white),
not answer(white, 1), not answer(black , 1)}
Rules r1-r2 are common to each SOLP program. Such rules set the admissible
spot colors. Rules r3-r8 represent the king. Rule r3 sets the number of wise men
(two in this case). By means of rules r4-r5, the king non-deterministically puts
a spot on each wise man’s forehead. Rule r6 represents the king’s statement “At
least one spot is white”. The king asks the question for the first time (rule r7)
and, after he has asked the question, if no agent gives an answer, then he asks the
question again (rule r8). Rule r9 is used to store into the predicate forehead the
information about the color of the corresponding wise man’s spot. Observe that
since each wise man cannot look at his own forehead, then the predicate forehead
is further referenced in SCs only. Rules r10 − r11 represent the case of exactly one
white spot: after the first time the king asks the question, if the first wise man sees
a black spot on the other wise man’s forehead, then he concludes that his spot is
white (rule r10). Otherwise, if the second wise man both has a white spot on his
forehead and he answers “white”, then the first wise man can conclude that the
other wise man has seen a black spot on his forehead. Thus, the first wise man
answers “black”. Finally, rule r12 represents the case of two white spots. In such a
case, after the first question, no wise man can conclude anything about the color
of his own spot. After the second time the king asks the question, each wise man
can answer “white” in case he sees a white spot and the other wise man has not
answered the previous king’s question. The correctness of such a statement can be
proved by contradiction: if a wise man had a black spot on his forehead, then the
other wise man would have seen it and, thus, he also would have answered “white”
after the first king’s question.
The SOLP program representing the second wise man (program W 2) is easily
obtained from W 1 by exchanging the role of the two wise men, i.e. by replacing
each occurrence of the program identifier W 2 by W 1.
For the sake of the simplicity we have considered a simple scenario, i.e. two wise
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men. It is possible to extend the reasoning encoded in the above programs, in order
to write a general program for n wise men, by exploiting the nesting feature of the
social conditions in such a way that reasoning on both the content and the temporal
sequence of the wise men’s statements is enabled.
8 Related Work
Contextual Reasoning - As pointed out in Section 7, a relationship exists between
our work and (Ghidini and Giunchiglia 2001), where the Local Model Semantics
(LMS) is proposed to reason about contexts.
A survey covering the use of contexts in many fields of Artificial Intelligence can
be found in (Bre´zillon 1999). An approach concerning contextual reasoning and
agent-based systems can be found in (De Saeger and Shimojima 2006).
In (McCarthy 1993), the author discusses the notion of context in Artificial In-
telligence in order to solve the problem of generality, that is every logic theory is
valid within the bounds of a definite context and it is possible to design a more
general context where such a theory is not valid anymore.
Other approaches have been proposed in (Buvacˇ and Mason 1993) and (Ghidini and Giunchiglia 2001).
Moreover, these two works are compared in (Serafini and Bouquet 2004). In the for-
mer work, the authors introduce the Propositional Logic of Context, a modal logic
aiming at formalizing McCarthy’s ideas.
An approach which is more closely related to ours is proposed in (Ghidini and Giunchiglia 2001),
where the authors consider a set of logic languages, each representing a different
context, and a suitable semantics is used to select among sets of local models, i.e.
models pertaining to a single language, those which satisfy a given compatibility
condition. Moreover, a proof-theoretical framework for contextual reasoning, called
Multi-Context Systems, is introduced where the notions of locality and compatibil-
ity are respectively captured by inference rules, whose scope is the single language,
and bridge rules establishing relationships among different languages.
Observe that, in the previous section, we have shown that such a machinery
can be represented by social rules where the body includes only member-selection-
condition-based SCs, each corresponding to a different context to be included into
the reasoning task. As a consequence, we argue that social rules are more general
than bridge rules, since the former provide also (possibly nested) cardinal-selection-
condition-based SCs. Since our work is not aimed to reason on contexts, a direct
comparison with (Ghidini and Giunchiglia 2001) cannot be done, although some
correspondences may be found between the model-theoretical formalizations of both
the Local Model Semantics and the Social Semantics. In particular, we feel that
the latter could be easily adapted to fully enable contextual reasoning inside logic
programming. This is left for future work.
Logic-based Multi-Agent Systems - A related approach, where the semantics of a
collection of abductive logic agents is given in terms of the stability of their interac-
tion can be found in (Bracciali et al. 2004) where the authors define the semantics
of a multi-agent system via a definition of stability on the set of all actions per-
38 F. Buccafurri and G. Caminiti
formed by all agents in the system, possibly arising from their communication and
interaction via observation. According to the authors, a set of actions committed
by different agents is stable if, assuming that an “oracle” could feed each of the
agents with all the actions in the set performed by the other agents, each agent
would do exactly what is in the set. We believe that such a machinery is similar
to our fixpoint-based approach since we guess candidate social interpretations and
select those which are compatible with the SCs of the SOLP collection.
In our work we focused on the formalization of the semantics, assuming a perfect
communication among the agents in such a way that each agent is able to know the
mental state of the others. Using a different approach from ours, in (Satoh and Yamamoto 2002),
in order to face the possible incompleteness of information due to communication
failures or delays in a multi-agent system, a default hypothesis is used as a tentative
answer and the computation continues until a reply is received which contradicts
with the default.
Another interesting work is the MINERVA agent architecture (Leite et al. 2002),
based on dynamic logic programming (Alferes et al. 2000). MINERVA is a modular
architecture, where every agent is composed of specialized sub-agents that execute
special tasks, e.g., reactivity, planning, scheduling, belief revision, action execution.
A common internal knowledge base, represented as one or more Multi-dimensional
Dynamic Logic Programs (MDLP) (Alferes et al. 2002), is concurrently manipu-
lated by its specialized sub-agents. The MDLPs may encode object-level knowledge,
or knowledge about goals, plans, intentions, etc.
The DALI project (Costantini and Tocchio 2002) is a complete multi-agent plat-
form entirely written in Prolog. A DALI program results in an agent which is
capable of reactive and proactive behaviour, triggered by several kinds of events.
The semantics of a DALI program is defined in terms of another program, where
reactive and proactive rules are reinterpreted as standard Horn Clause rules.
Laima (De Vos et al. 2005) agents are represented as Ordered Choice Logic Pro-
grams (OCLP) (De Vos 2003) for modelling their knowledge and reasoning capa-
bilities. Communication between the agents is regulated by uni-directional channels
transporting information based on their answer sets.
IMPACT (Subrahmanian et al. 2000) is an agent platform where programs may
be used to specify what an agent is either obliged to do, may do, or cannot do on
the basis of deontic operators of permission, obligation and prohibition. IMPACT
is grounded on a solid semantic framework based on the concept of feasible status
set, which describes a set of actions dictated by an agent program that is consistent
with the obligations and restrictions on the agent itself. Agent programs define
integrity constraints, which must be satisfied in order to provide a feasible status
set. The adoption of a logic programming based formalism, and the use of integrity
constraints to define a feasible status set, guarantee agents to behave in a way that
some desired properties hold.
Societies Of ComputeeS (SOCS) (Alberti et al. 2004) is a project that was funded
by European Union. The idea is to provide a computational logic model for the
description, analysis and verification of global and open societies of heterogeneous
computees. The computee model is proposed as a full-fledged agent model, based
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on extended logic programming, allowing to define and study properties that can
be enforced by its operational model.
Since our approach relies on the general notion of social behaviour, it is of course
interesting to illustrate how this concept is dealt with in the related field of intelli-
gent agents, in order to make evident that – even in such context – this notion takes
an important role. Indeed, beside autonomy, intelligent agents (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995;
Wooldridge 2000) may be required to have social ability. The meaning of this con-
cept is two-fold: (1) the presence of a common language for communication, and (2)
the capability of reasoning on the content of communication acts. Concerning item
(1), KQML (Mayfield and Finin 1995), and FIPA ACL (Cost et al. 2001), both
based on the speech act theory (Cohen and Levesque 1990), represent the main ef-
forts done in the last years. The state-of-the-art literature on item (2) is represented
by (Wooldridge 2000; van der Hoek and Wooldrige 2003; Mascardi et al. 2004). So-
cial ability allows thus the agent individuals to have beliefs, desires and intentions
(BDI) (Rao and Georgeff 1995; Rao 1996) as a result of both the mutual commu-
nication and the consequent individual reasoning.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have proposed a new language, Social Logic Programming (SOLP),
which extends Compromise Logic Programming and enables social behaviour among
a community of individuals whose reasoning is represented by logic programs. A
rich set of examples shows that the language has very nice capabilities of represent-
ing such a kind of knowledge. Moreover, we have given a translation from SOLP to
logic programming with aggregates and discussed the computational complexity of
several decision problems related to the social semantics.
Basically, the present paper gives the theoretical core for a multi-agent oriented
software environment, including suitable specialized features, like information hid-
ing, speech-act mechanisms, security and so on. However, these issues are interesting
directions of our future work.
For instance, information hiding can be implemented as follows. Given a SOLP
collection C , we make the following assumption: by default each agent cannot see
into other agents’ mind, that is all atoms in each SOLP program are viewed only
by the program itself, i.e. they are private. In order to make some atom public we
could add a suffix, say P , to such an atom, i.e. a is meant as private, while aP is
meant as the public version of a. Then, by means of a suitable modification of our
translation machinery, any social condition can be activated only on public atoms.
An agent communication machinery can be conceived that relies on the above
feature. In case an agent wants to send a message to another agent, then the former
could make public a suitable set of atoms in such a way that they are visible only to
the latter. This approach could be easily extended to the scenario where one agent
wants to send a message to either a group of agents or to the whole community.
Another feature we intend to include into future extensions of SOLP is the rep-
resentation of evolving agent mental states. We believe that a collection of SOLP
programs could be easily managed by some existing logic framework which is tai-
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lored to program update or belief revision tasks, such as, for instance, Dynamic
Logic Programming (DLP) (Alferes et al. 2000). The resulting system should work
in a cyclic fashion: (i) social models of the SOLP collection are computed, (ii) by
exploiting DLP, the SOLP programs within the collection are possibly updated
according to the intended evolution of agent beliefs and intentions, (iii) the cycle
restarts. Starting from the basic approach proposed in Section 7 (Example 16), an-
other interesting issue to investigate is the capability of the language, in the general
case, of representing cooperative approaches to solving combinatorial optimization
problems, possibly by introducing some suitable extensions.
Finally, we plan to enhance the language of SOLP by adding both classical nega-
tion and rule-head disjunction. We expect the former to be easy to implement,
while the integration of latter requires some preliminary study, as the introduction
of disjunction in logic programming always results in a growth of the language
expressivity towards higher levels in the computational complexity hierarchy.
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Appendix A
In order to improve the overall readability of the paper, a number of lemma and
theorem proofs have been moved to this section.
Lemma 1 (see page 18) Given a SOLP collection SP = {P1, · · · ,Pn}, an integer j
(1 ≤ j ≤ n), a SOLP program Pj ∈ SP , a social interpretation I¯ for SP and a SC
s ∈ MSCPj , it holds that s is true for Pj w.r.t. I¯ iff ∃M ∈ SM (C (P1, · · · ,Pn)∪Q)
s.t. ρ(s)Pj ∈ M , where Q = {a ←| a ∈ I¯ }.
Proof
Before starting with the proof, let us denote the set of all the SCs occurring in s
(plus the SC s itself) by N (s), and the LPA program C (P1, · · · ,Pn) by C¯ .
(⇒). We have to prove that if s is true for Pj w.r.t. I¯ , then there exists a
stable model M of the logic program C¯ ∪Q s.t. the atom ρ(s)Pj , corresponding to
s by means of the translation, is included in M . We proceed by induction on the
maximum nesting depth (see page 3) of the SCs in N (s), d = maxs′∈N (s){depth(s
′)}
(d ≥ 0).
(Basis). In case d = 0, then N (s) = {s} and depth(s) = 0 (recall the definition of
the function depth on page 3). Since |N (s)| = 1, s is a simple SC, i.e. skel(s) = ∅.
Now, assume by contradiction that s is true for Pj w.r.t. I¯ and that for each
M ∈ SM (C¯ ∪Q), ρ(s)Pj 6∈ M . Observe now that it may occur either the following
cases: (1) cond(s) = [Pk ](1 ≤ k ≤ n), or (2) cond(s) = [l , h].
In case (1), according to Definition 13 (page 16), there exists a set S = {r1, r2} ⊆
C¯ ∪Q such that:
r1 : ρ(s)Pj ← (g(s))(k)Pj
r2 : (g(s))(k)Pj ←
V
b∈content(s) bPk
and for each r ∈ (C¯ ∪Q) \ S , head(r) 6= r1 ∧ head(r) 6= r2.
Since we have assumed that ρ(s)Pj 6∈ M , it is easy to see that both body(r1)
and body(r2) are false w.r.t. M . Moreover, it holds that for each M ∈ SM (C¯ ∪Q),
I¯ ⊆ M , as Q = {a ←| a ∈ I¯ }. As a consequence, body(r2) is false w.r.t. I¯ .
Since the elements occurring in body(r2) are labeled literals, we have proven that
cond(s) = [Pk ] and that the condition ∀a ∈ content(s), a is true for Pk w.r.t. I¯
does not hold. Such a result, according to Definition 8 (page 11), contradicts the
hypothesis that s is true for Pj w.r.t. I¯ and, therefore, concludes the proof of the
basis of the induction, in case (1).
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In case (2), since skel(s) = ∅, according to Definition 13 (page 16), there exists a
set of rules S = {r1} ∪ {si | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} ⊆ (C¯ ∪Q) such that:
r1 : ρ(s)Pj ← l ≤ #count{K : (g(s))(K )Pj ,K 6= j } ≤ h
si : (g(s))(i)Pj ←
V
b∈content(s) bPi (1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n).
Moreover, for each r ∈ (C¯ ∪Q) \ S and for each t ∈ S , head(r) 6= head(t).
Now, since ρ(s)Pj 6∈ M , body(r1) is false w.r.t.M . Since body(r1) = l ≤ #count{K :
(g(s))(K )Pj ,K 6= j} ≤ h, according to the definition of aggregate functions (Dell’Armi et al. 2003),
for each D ⊆ {i | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} (l ≤ |D | ≤ h), there exists k s.t. 1 ≤ k 6=
j ≤ n and (g(s))(k)Pj is false w.r.t. M . Thus, there exists a rule sk ∈ C¯ ∪ Q
s.t. sk : (g(s))(k)Pj ←
∧
b∈content(s) bPk and head(sk ) is false w.r.t. M . Since ∀r ∈
(C¯ ∪Q)\{sk}, head(r) 6= head((sk ), body(sk ) is false w.r.t. M , i.e.
∧
b∈content(s) bPk
is false w.r.t. M . Now, since I¯ ⊆ M ,
∧
b∈content(s) bPk is false w.r.t. I¯ .
Thus, we have proven that for each set D ⊆ {i | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} s.t. l ≤ |D | ≤ h,
there exists some k ∈ D and some x ∈ content(s) s.t. x is false for Pk w.r.t. I¯ . This
result, according to item (2) of Definition 8 (page 11), contradicts the hypothesis
that s is true for Pk w.r.t. I¯ . Now we have concluded the proof of of the basis of
the induction.
(Induction). Assume that the statement holds for maxs′∈N (s){depth(s
′)} = d > 0
and consider the case maxs′∈N (s){depth(s
′)} = d + 1. First, observe that s is not
simple, because skel(s) 6= ∅. Since s is well-formed, cond(s) = [l , h]. Thus, according
to Definition 13 (page 16), there exists a set of rules S = {r1} ∪ {si | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤
n} ⊆ (C¯ ∪Q) s.t.:
r1 : ρ(s)Pj ← l ≤ #count{K : (g(s))(K )Pj ,K 6= j } ≤ h
si : (g(s))(i)Pj ←
V
b∈content(s) bPi ∧
V
s′∈skel(s) ρ(s
′)Pj (1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n)
Now, observe that:
(1) For each s ′ ∈ skel(s), maxσ∈N (s′){depth(σ)} = d , and
(2) Since s is true for Pk w.r.t. I¯ , according to Definition 8 (page 11), for each
s ′ ∈ skel(s), s ′ is true for Pj w.r.t. I¯ .
On the basis of the above observations and the induction hypothesis, it holds
that for each s ′ ∈ skel(s), ρ(s ′)Pj ∈ M .
Since s is true for Pj w.r.t. I¯ and cond(s) = [l , h], according to Definition 8
(page 11) there exists D ⊆ SP \ {Pj} s.t. l ≤ |D | ≤ h and ∀a ∈ content(s),
∀P ∈ D , a is true for P w.r.t. I¯ .
Thus, it holds that, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that both i 6= j and Pi ∈ D ,∧
b∈content(s) bPi ∧
∧
s′∈skel(s) ρ(s
′)Pj is true w.r.t.M , as I¯ ⊆ M . SinceM is a stable
model of C¯ ∪Q , according to the definition of the set S (given at the beginning of
the part (Induction)), for each i s.t. 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n and s.t. Pi ∈ D , (g(s))(i)Pj is
true w.r.t. M .
Since l ≤ |D | ≤ h, there exists a set of literals D ′ = {(g(s))(i)Pj | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n}
s.t. l ≤ |D ′| ≤ h and s.t. for each element d ∈ D ′, d is true w.r.t. M .
Now, according to the definition of aggregate functions (Dell’Armi et al. 2003),
body(r1) is true w.r.t. M and, since M is a stable model of C¯ ∪Q , head(r1) is true
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w.r.t. M , i.e. ρ(s)Pj is true w.r.t. M . Such a result concludes the only-if part (⇒)
of the proof.
(⇐). We have to prove that if ∃M ∈ SM (C¯ ∪ Q) | ρ(s)Pj ∈ M , then s is true
for Pj w.r.t. I¯ . We proceed by induction on the maximum nesting depth of the
elements in N (s), d = maxs′∈N (s){depth(s
′)} (d ≥ 0).
(Basis). In case d = 0, then N (s) = {s} and depth(s) = 0. Since |N (s)| = 1, s
is a simple SC, i.e. skel(s) = ∅. Observe now that it may occur either the following
cases: (1) cond(s) = [Pk ](1 ≤ k ≤ n), or (2) cond(s) = [l , h].
In case (1), according to Definition 13 (page 16), there exist two rules in C¯ ∪Q
of the form:
r1 : ρ(s)Pj ← (g(s))(k)Pj
r2 : (g(s))(k)Pj ←
V
b∈content(s) bPk
and such that ∀r ∈ (C¯ ∪Q) \ {r1, r2}, head(r) 6= head(r1) ∧ head(r) 6= head(r2).
As a consequence, since ρ(s)Pj ∈ M , body(r1) is true w.r.t. M . Now, since M is
a stable model of C¯ ∪Q , body(r2) is true w.r.t. M .
Now, observe that according to Definitions 12 and 13 (see pages 15 and 16), for
each b ∈ content(s), bPk 6∈ (M \ I¯ ), because M \ I¯ includes only literals that are
auxiliary to the translation. As a consequence, body(r2) is true w.r.t. I¯ , i.e. for each
b ∈ content(s), b is true for Pk w.r.t. I¯ .
Now, we have proven that cond(s) = [Pk ](1 ≤ k ≤ n) and there exists Pk ∈ SP
s.t. for each a ∈ content(s), a is true for Pk w.r.t. I¯ , thus, s is true for Pk w.r.t. I¯ .
This concludes the proof of the basis of the induction, in case (1).
In case (2), since skel(s) = ∅, according to Definition 13 (page 16), there exists a
set of rules S = {r1} ∪ {si | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} ⊆ (C¯ ∪Q) such that:
r1 : ρ(s)Pj ← l ≤ #count{K : (g(s))(K )Pj ,K 6= j } ≤ h
si : (g(s))(i)Pj ←
V
b∈content(s) bPi (1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n).
Moreover, for each r ∈ (C¯ ∪Q) \ S and for each t ∈ S , head(r) 6= head(t).
Since M is a stable model of C¯ ∪ Q and ρ(s)Pj ∈ M , body(r1) is true w.r.t. M .
According to the definition of aggregate functions (Dell’Armi et al. 2003), there
exists a set of integers D s.t. l ≤ |D | ≤ h, for each i , i 6= j and Pi ∈ SP and, finally,
for each i ∈ D , (g(s))(i)Pj is true w.r.t. M .
As a consequence, there exists a set of rules D ′ = {si | i ∈ D ∧ head(si) =
(g(s))(i)Pj } ⊆ S \ {r1} s.t. for each rule si ∈ D
′, body(si ) is true w.r.t. M . Since
I¯ ⊆ M , it holds that for each si ∈ D
′, body(si ) is true w.r.t. I¯ . Now, observe
that l ≤ |D ′| = |D | ≤ h and that, according to Definition 13 (page 16), for each
si ∈ D , body(si ) =
∧
b∈content(s) bPi . We have obtained that there exists a set D
s.t. l ≤ |D | ≤ h, for each i ∈ D , i 6= j and Pi ∈ SP . Finally, it holds that for each
b ∈ content(s) and for each i ∈ D , b is true for Pi w.r.t. I¯ . Now, it results that there
exists a set ∆ = {Pi | i ∈ D ∧ Pi ∈ SP} s.t. ∆ ⊆ SP \ {Pj}, l ≤ |Delta| = |D | ≤ h
and for each b ∈ content(s), and for each P ∈ ∆, b is true for Pi w.r.t. I¯ .
According to Definition 8 (page 11), we have proven that s is true for Pj w.r.t.
I¯ . Such a result concludes the proof of the basis of the induction.
(Induction). Assume that the statement holds formaxs′∈N (s){depth(s
′)} = d > 0.
and consider the case maxs′∈N (s){depth(s
′)} = d + 1. First, observe that s is not
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simple. Since s is well-formed, cond(s) = [l , h]. Thus, according to Definition 13
(page 16), there exists a set of rules S = {r1}∪ {si | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} ⊆ (C¯ ∪Q) s.t.:
r1 : ρ(s)Pj ← l ≤ #count{K : (g(s))(K )Pj ,K 6= j } ≤ h
si : (g(s))(i)Pj ←
V
b∈content(s) bPi ∧
V
s′∈skel(s) ρ(s
′)Pj (1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n)
Moreover, for each r ∈ (C¯ ∪Q) \ S and for each t ∈ S , head(r) 6= head(t).
Now, observe that, since ρ(s)Pj ∈ M andM is a stable model of C¯ ∪Q , according
to the definition of aggregate functions (Dell’Armi et al. 2003), there exists a set
∆′ ⊆ {(g(s))(i)Pj | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} s.t. l ≤ |∆
′| ≤ h and ∀x ∈ ∆′, x is true w.r.t.
M . Thus, there exists ∆′′ ⊆ S \ {r1} s.t. l ≤ |∆′′| = |∆′| = |∆| ≤ h and s.t. for
each si ∈ ∆′′, head(si ) is true w.r.t. M . Since M is a stable model of C¯ ∪ Q , for
each si ∈ ∆′′, body(si ) is true w.r.t. M . Now, note that for each i s.t. si ∈ ∆′′,
body(si ) =
∧
b∈content(s) bPi ∧
∧
s′∈skel(s) ρ(s
′)Pj .
Thus, for each i s.t. si ∈ ∆′′,
∧
b∈content(s) bPi is true w.r.t.M and
∧
s′∈skel(s) ρ(s
′)Pj
is true w.r.t. M .
Now, since I¯ ⊆ M and according to Definition 13 (page 16), for each i s.t.
si ∈ ∆′′,
∧
b∈content(s) bPi is true w.r.t. I¯ . Since for each i s.t. si ∈ ∆
′′, bPi is a
literal labelled w.r.t. Pi , it is easy to see that for each i s.t. si ∈ ∆′′ and for each
b ∈ content(s), b is true for Pi w.r.t. I¯ . Moreover, by induction hypothesis, for
each s ′ ∈ skel(s), s ′ is true for Pj w.r.t. I¯ .
Thus, we have obtained that cond(s) = [l , h] and there exists a set D ⊆ {i |
1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} s.t. l ≤ |D | ≤ h and for each i ∈ D s.t. Pi ∈ SP and for each
a ∈ content(s), it holds that a is true w.r.t. P and for each s ′ ∈ skel(s), s ′ is true
for Pj w.r.t. I¯ . According to Definition 8 (page 11), we have proven that s is true
for Pj w.r.t. I¯ . This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Theorem 2 (see page 22)
Given a SOLP collection SP = {P1, · · · ,Pn}, it holds that A = B , where:
A = SM (P ′u ∪ C (P1, · · · ,Pn)) and
B = {F¯ ∪ G¯ ∪ H¯ |
F¯ =
⋃
1≤i≤n(F
i)Pi ∧ F
i ∈ AFP(Pi) ∧ F¯ ∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) ∧ (1)
G¯ =
⋃
1≤i≤n(G
i )Pi ∧ (G
i)Pi = [F
i ]Pi \ (F
i)Pi ∧ (2)
H¯ =
⋃
1≤i≤n(H
i)Pi ∧ (H
i)Pi =
⋃
s∈MSCPi SAT
Pi
F¯
(s)}. (3)
Proof
Before starting with the proof, let us denote C (P1, · · · ,Pn) by C¯ .
(⊆). By contradiction, assume that ∀X ∈ A,X 6∈ B . Observe that, according
to Definitions 14, 17 and 20 (see pages 16, 18 and 20, respectively), it holds that
X = F¯ ∪ G¯ ∪ H¯ such that F¯ ∩ G¯ = ∅, G¯ ∩ H¯ = ∅, F¯ ∩ H¯ = ∅. Thus, we prove that
either condition (1), (2), or (3) is false. We consider each condition separately.
Condition (1). In case condition (1) is false, it holds that F¯ 6∈ SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn).
It follows that either:
(a) ∃i | (F i )Pi ⊆ F¯ ∧ F
i 6∈ AFP(Pi), or
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(b) ∃i , r | (F i)Pi ⊆ F¯ ∧ F
i ∈ AFP(Pi) ∧ r ∈ Pi ∧ STC (F¯ ) 6= F¯ .
In case (a), by virtue of Lemma 5 (page 21), it holds that (F i)Pi 6⊆ SM (Pu). As
a consequence, it is easy to see that (F i)Pi 6⊆ SM (P
′
u ∪ C¯ ). Since (F
i)Pi ∈ X , then
we have thus reached a contradiction.
If item (b) occurs, it holds that either:
(b1) ∃a,Pi | Pi ∈ C ∧ aPi ∈ F¯ ∧ aPi 6∈ STC (F¯ ), or
(b2) ∃a,Pi | Pi ∈ C ∧ aPi 6∈ F¯ ∧ aPi ∈ STC (F¯ ).
In case (b1), both the following conditions are true:
(i) ∀r ∈ Pi , body(r) is true w.r.t. F¯ ⇒ head(r) 6= a, and
(ii) ∀r ∈ Pi , body(r) is true w.r.t. F¯ ∧ a is true for Pj w.r.t. F¯ ⇒ head(r) 6=
okay(a).
In case (i) of item (b1), it holds that, according to Definitions 15 and 16 (pages
17 and 17), for each r ′ ∈ S ′2(Pˆi), s.t. body(r
′) is true w.r.t. X , it results that
head(r ′) 6= saPi . Thus, saPi 6∈ X . As a consequence, according to the definition of
S ′3(Pˆi) (see Definition 16, page 17), it holds that aPi 6∈ X . Since the hypothesis
requires that aPi ∈ F¯ and F¯ ⊆ X , we have reached a contradiction.
Consider now case (ii) of item (b1). It holds that, according to Definitions 15
and 16 (pages 17 and 17), for each r ′ ∈ S ′2(Pˆi) s.t. aPi ∧ body(r
′) is true w.r.t.
X , it results that head(r ′) 6= saPi . Thus, saPi 6∈ X . According to the definition
of S ′3(Pˆi), it holds that aPi 6∈ X . Since the hypothesis requires that aPi ∈ F¯ and
F¯ ⊆ X , we have reached a contradiction. This concludes the part of the proof
concerning item (b1) above.
Consider now item (b2). In this case at least one of the following conditions holds:
(i) ∃r ∈ Pi | body(r) is true w.r.t. F¯ ∧ a is true for Pj w.r.t. F¯ ∧ head(r) =
okay(a),
(ii) ∃r ∈ Pi | body(r) is true w.r.t. F¯ ∧ head(r) = a.
If case (i) of item (b2) occurs, it holds that aPi ∈ F¯ . Now, the contradiction is
thus reached, since according to the hypothesis, aPi 6∈ F¯ .
Consider now case (ii) of item (b2). Let r be of the form a ← b1, · · · bν , s1, · · · , sm
(we do not lose in generality because r is any social rule). According to Definitions 15
and 16 (pages 17 and 17), there exists a rule r ′ ∈ S ′2(Pˆi) such that r
′ has the form
saPi ← b
1
Pi
, · · · , bνPi , ρ(s1)Pi , · · · ρ(sm)Pi .
Now, since body(r) is true w.r.t. F¯ and on the basis of results of Lemma 1
(page 18), it holds that body(r ′) is true w.r.t. X and head(r ′) = saPi . According to
the definition of S ′3(Pˆi) (see Definition 16, page 17), since aPi 6∈ X , then it holds
that saPi 6∈ X . Thus, body(r
′) is true w.r.t. X and head(r ′) is false w.r.t. X . As a
consequence, there exists a rule r ′ in P ′u ∪ C¯ such that r
′ is false w.r.t. the model
X (X ∈ SM (P ′u ∪ C¯ )) which is a contradiction. The proof of condition (1) is thus
concluded. Let us prove now condition (2).
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Condition (2). In case condition (2) is false, there exists i s.t. (G i )Pi 6= [F
i ]Pi \
(F i)Pi . Thus, (F
i)Pi∪(G
i )Pi 6= [F
i ]Pi and then, according to Definition 20 (page 20),
(F i)Pi ∪(G
i)Pi 6⊆
⋃
F∈AFP(Pi )
{[F ]Pi}. Now, by virtue of Lemmas 3 and 5 (pages 20
and 21), (F i )Pi ∪ (G
i)Pi 6⊆ SM (Pu) (recall that Pu =
⋃
1≤i≤n Γ
′(A(Pˆi))). Accord-
ing to Definitions 14, 16 and 17 (see pages 16, 17 and 18, respectively), it is easy
to see that (F i)Pi ∪ (G
i)Pi 6⊆ SM (P
′
u ∪ C¯ ). Since (F
i)Pi ∪ (G
i)Pi ∈ X , we have
reached a contradiction. Consider now the last case.
Condition (3). If condition (3) is false, then there exists i such that H iPi is not
equal to
⋃
s∈MSCPi SAT
Pi
F¯
(s). Thus, it holds that either:
(a) ∃h ∈ (H i)Pi | h 6∈
⋃
s∈MSCPi SAT
Pi
F¯
(s), or
(b) ∃h ∈
⋃
s∈MSCPi SAT
Pi
F¯
(s) | h 6∈ (H i)Pi .
In case (a), according to Definition 21 (page 22), since h 6∈
⋃
s∈MSCPi SAT
Pi
F¯
(s),
it holds that ∀M ∈ SM (C¯ ∪Q) s.t. Q = {a ←| a ∈ F¯}, it results that h 6∈ M . As a
consequence, according to Definition 17 (page 18), we have that ∀M ∈ SM (P ′u∪C¯ ),
h 6∈ M . Now, we have reached a contradiction.
In case (b), according to Definition 21 (page 22), h is either an auxiliary ρ-atom
or a g-predicate and it holds that h 6∈ (H i)Pi . Since H¯ =
⋃
1≤k≤n(H
k )Pk , and h is
labeled w.r.t. Pi , h 6∈ H¯ .
Now we have reached a contradiction, because h ∈ X \ H¯ = F¯ ∪ G¯ and F¯ ∪ G¯
does not include, according to conditions (1) and (2) of the theorem statement,
either ρ-atoms or g-predicates.
(⊇). By contradiction, assume that ∀X ∈ B ,X = F¯ ∪ G¯ ∪ H¯ and both conditions
(1), (2) and (3) of the theorem statement hold and further X 6∈ A (recall that
A = SM (P ′u ∪ C¯ )).
As a consequence, either:
(a) ∃r ∈ P ′u ∪ C¯ | r is false w.r.t. X , i.e. head(r) is false w.r.t. X and body(r) is
true w.r.t. X , or
(b) ∃X ′ ⊂ X | ∀r ∈ P ′u ∪ C¯ , r is true w.r.t. X
′.
In case (a), according to Definition 16 (page 17), there exist Pi , r
′ s.t. Pi ∈ SP ,
r ′ ∈ Pi , r
′ is a social rule a ← b1, · · · bν , s1, · · · , sm and r , according to the definition
of S ′2(Pˆi), has the form saPi ← b
1
Pi
, · · · , bνPi , ρ(s1)Pi , · · · ρ(sm)Pi .
Now, since body(r) is true w.r.t. X and X = F¯ ∪ G¯ ∪ H¯ , for each k (1 ≤ k ≤ ν),
bkPi is true w.r.t. F¯ . Therefore, for each k (1 ≤ k ≤ ν), b is true for Pi w.r.t. F¯ .
By virtue of Lemma 1 (page 18), for each l (1 ≤ l ≤ m), sl is true for Pi w.r.t. F¯ .
Thus, it holds that body(r ′) is true w.r.t. F¯ . Moreover, according to the definition
of S ′3(Pi) (see Definition 16, page 17), head(r
′) is false w.r.t. F¯ , since head(r) is
false w.r.t. F¯ .
As a consequence, the social rule r ′ ∈ Pi is false w.r.t. F¯ . Therefore, F¯ is not a
social model of P1, · · · ,Pn . Now, we have reached a contradiction.
In case (b), at least one of the following conditions holds, either:
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(α) (X \X ′) ∩ F¯ 6= ∅, or
(β) (X \X ′) ∩ G¯ 6= ∅, or
(γ) (X \X ′) ∩ H¯ 6= ∅.
If condition (α) occurs, according to both the hypothesis and Definition 16
(page 17), then there exist Pi , r , a s.t Pi ∈ SP , r ∈ S ′1(Pi), aPi ∈ (X \X
′)∩ F¯ , and
r has the form a′Pi ←not aPi . Now, since aPi ∈ (X \X
′)∩ F¯ , it holds that aPi ∈ X
and a′Pi 6∈ X (otherwise, according to r , X would not be a model of P
′
u ∪ C¯ ). Now,
since X ′ ⊆ X , it holds that a′Pi 6∈ X
′. Therefore, there exists a social rule r ∈ P ′u∪C¯
s.t. r is false w.r.t. X ′. As a consequence, X ′ is not a model of P ′u ∪ C¯ and we have
reached a contradiction. This concludes the proof of case (b), condition (α).
In case (b), if condition (β) holds, then according to both the hypothesis and
Definition 16 (page 17), either:
(i) There exist Pi , r , a′ s.t. Pi ∈ SP , r ∈ S ′1(Pi), a
′
Pi
∈ (X \ X ′) ∩ G¯ and r has
the form aPi ←not a
′
Pi
, or
(ii) There exist Pi , r , a s.t. Pi ∈ SP , r ∈ S ′3(Pi), aPi ∈ X¯ , saPi ∈ (X \ X
′) ∩ G¯
and r has the form failPi ←not failPi , aPi ,not saPi .
If item (i) is true, then r is false w.r.t. X ′, since a′Pi 6∈ X
′ and aPi 6∈ X
′. Thus,
X ′ is not a model of P ′u ∪ C¯ and we have reached a contradiction.
If item (ii) holds, then r is false w.r.t. X ′, since, according to the hypothesis,
saPi ∈ X . Therefore, aPi ∈ X . As a result, saPi 6∈ X
′ and aPi ∈ X
′. Thus, X ′ is
not a model of of P ′u ∪ C¯ and we have reached a contradiction. This concludes the
proof of case (b), condition (β). Now we give the proof when condition (γ) holds.
In case (b), if condition (γ) holds, then there exist Pi , h s.t. Pi ∈ SP and hPi ∈
(X \ X ′) ∩ H¯ . Since X ′ is a model of P ′u ∪ C¯ , according to Definitions 12 and 21
(pages 15 and 22), there exists some aPi in F¯ ∪ G¯ s.t. aPi ∈ (X \ X
′). Therefore,
either condition (α) or condition (β) of case (b) occurs and it is easy to see that
we have reached a contradiction. Now we have concluded the proof of the theorem.
List of Symbols and Abbreviations
[ ]P Operator that produces a set of auxiliary atoms labelled w.r.t.
P and used in the translation process
Γ′() The mapping from SOLP programs to traditional logic programs
Pˆ A logic program obtained from P after a rewriting of the toler-
ance rules occurring in it
LPA The non-disjunctive fragment of logic programming with aggre-
gates supported by the DLV system
SOS(P1, · · · ,Pn) The set of all social models of P1, · · · ,Pn
U(P1, · · · ,Pn) The set of all the possible combinations of autonomous fixpoints
of the SOLP programs P1, · · · ,Pn
OKAY (P) The set of okay rules of the COLP program P
ΨP(s) The translation of a single SC s of a SOLP program P
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ρ(s), g(s) Atoms and predicates associated with the social condition s
σn(P) The translation of a COLP program P into a SOLP program
A() The autonomous reduction operator
AFP(P) The set of all autonomous fixpoints of P
C (P1, · · · ,Pn) The LP
A program resulting from the translation of all the SCs
included in the SOLP collection {P1, · · · ,Pn}
FP(P) The set of all fixpoints of P
IC -SOSn The decision problem “individually credulous reasoning”
IS -SOSn The decision problem “individually skeptical reasoning”
JFP(P1, · · · ,Pn) The set of the joint fixpoints of the COLP programs P1, · · · ,Pn
MSCP The set of all the SCs (with depth 0) occurring in P
MSC 〈P,r ,n〉 The set of all the SCs having a given depth n and occurring in
a social rule r of a SOLP program P
P ′u The traditional program resulting from the translation of all the
SOLP programs in a SOLP collection, where the SCs are re-
placed by ρ-atoms
SAT A set of ρ-atoms and g-predicates associated with the social
conditions true for a given SOLP program w.r.t. a social inter-
pretation
SC -SOSn The decision problem “socially credulous reasoning”
SM (P) The set of all the stable models of P
SOSn The decision problem “social model existence”
SS -SOSn The decision problem “socially skeptical reasoning”
STC () The social immediate consequence operator, applied to the SOLP
collection C
TP(r) The translation of the SCs included in a social rule r of P
TP() The immediate consequence operator, applied to the program P
TR(P) The set of tolerance rules in the program P
USCP The set of all the SCs (at any nesting depth) in P
Var(P) The set of atoms appearing in P
W P The translation of the SCs included in P
(n-)SC (n-)Social Condition
COLP COmpromise Logic Programming
JFP Joint Fixpoint Semantics
NAF Negation As Failure
SOLP SOcial Logic Programming
